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UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE UNDER
STATE EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
RORY WEINER

*

Without health there is no happiness. And attention to
health, then, should take the place of every other object.. " The
most uninformed mind, with a healthy body, is happier than the
wisest valetudinarian.
Thomas Jefferson 1
Doctors and hospitals have become such massively impor
tant features of contemporary life that to be cut off from the help
they provide is not only dangerous but also degrading.
Michael Walzer2
INTRODUCTION

After President Clinton's failed attempt in 1993 to reform the
United States health care system, some observers predicted that the
system would reform itself through free-market competition. 3
Competition among insurance companies and health plans, some
believed, would expand access, reduce prices, and improve quality.4
Yet the free market has failed to do any of these things. The num
ber of uninsured Americans has steadily increased. 5 Prices, al
* Law Clerk, Judge Michael A. Ponsor, United States District Court for the Dis
trict of Massachusetts. B.S., 1984, University of South Florida; Ph.D. in philosophy,
1993, University of Florida; J.D., 1999, Western New England College School of Law. I
would like to thank Prof. James A. Gardner for his helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this Article.
1. I JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLEcnON OF THE VIEWS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 402 (J. P. Foley ed., 1967).
2. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 89 (1983).
3. See Erik Eckholm, While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Transforms It
self, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at AI.
4. See id.
5. According to the most recent data, in 1999, 15.5% of Americans lacked health
insurance coverage; although this number was down from the previous year, it was an
increase from 13.6% at the start of the 1990s. See Mary Leonard, Questions of Care:
The Shattering Cost of Disease, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3,2000, at A22 (citing the U.S.
Census Bureau). For data on the trend of increasing uninsured throughout the 1990s,
327
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though stable for a few years,6 have surged recently,7 and the
quality of care has eroded. s In fact, most of the incremental federal
and state legislation, passed since the failed Clinton Health Plan,
remedies the inadequacies of the free-market model of distributing
health care. 9
see HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH IN
SURANCE DATA 22 (1998).
6. See Katharine Levit et aI., Health Spending in 1998: S,ignals of Change,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 124, 125 (documenting that health care's share of gross
domestic product remained stable for six consecutive years, from 1993 to 1998).
7. See Julie Appleby, Medical Costs Are Rising and Insurance Premiums Could
Jump 20% - Signs That Managed Care Isn't Working, USA TODAY, Dec. 8-10, 2000, at
Al (reporting biggest premium hikes in a decade, and challenging effectiveness of
HMOs to control health care inflation); Jon Gabel et aI., Job-Based Health Insurance in
2000: Premiums Rise Sharply While Coverage Grows, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at
144, 145 (finding that premiums across the country among all plan types rose 8.3% in
2000, the largest increase since 1993); see also Kip Sullivan, On the 'Efficiency' of Man
aged Care Plans, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2000, at 139 (arguing that there is inconclu
sive evidence to support claim that managed care health plans save money).
8. See David V. Himmelstein et aI., Quality of Care in Investor-Owned vs. Not
for-Profit HMOs, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 159, 162 (1999) (concluding that investor
owned HMOs, which now dominate the managed care marketplace, deliver lower qual
ity of care than not-for-profit plans when researchers analyzed data from the National
Committee for Quality Assurance and other applicable industry data); see also John V.
Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven
Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 708 (1997) (arguing that managed care's
undermining of the fiduciary relationship has eroded quality of care). For a thorough
discussion of how to define, measure, and improve the quality of care, see Beth C.
Weitzman, Improving Quality of Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES 370 (Anthony R. Kovner & Steven Jonas eds., 1999).
9. See, e.g., Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 29 U.S.c.
§ 1185 (1999), 42 U.S.c. §§ 300gg-4, 300gg-51 (2000) (prohibiting, inter alia, a health
plan from denying mothers and newborns at least 48 hours in a hospital after a vaginal
delivery and 96 hours after a cesarean); Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.c.
§ 1185a (1999) (proscribing group health plans offering mental health benefits from
setting annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health benefits that are lower than
those for medical and surgical benefits); Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of
1998, 29 U.S.c. § 1185b (2000) (requiring health coverage for all stages of reconstruc
tive surgery after mastectomies, including surgery necessary for symmetrical appear
ance); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.c. § 300gg
(2000) (remedying problems related to employees with pre-existing medical conditions
losing health insurance when changing jobs).
The states have also passed incremental legislation addressing the failures of the
free-market model. See Fred J. Hellinger, The Expanding Scope of State Legislation,
276 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1065 (1996) (detailing states' efforts to legislate in the health
care arena); Note, Recent Legislation-Health Care Law-"Drive Through Delivery" Reg
ulation, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2116 (1996) (describing the content and context of a Massa
chusetts statute directed at regulating the treatment of women at childbirth); see
generally NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, 1997 MANUAL ON STATE AND LOCAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIGENT HEALTH CARE (1997), available at www.healthlaw.org
(regularly updated); Families USA, THE BEST FROM THE STATES, PARTS I AND II, TEXT
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For some health care advocates, the surest way to motivate
Congress to pass universal health insurance legislation is to argue
that access to health care is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. lO Unfortunately, like education, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does
not guarantee such a right.11 Nevertheless, legal advocates have
successfully turned to state constitutional law to expand access to
education. 12 Could a health care advocate do the same in the con
text of expanding access to health care? The purpose of this Article
is to explore this question. 13
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the emergence of state
OF KEY STATE HMO CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS (1998), available at
www.familiesusa.orglbest1.htm.andlbest2.htm.
10. See Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the
Law: The Need for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (1986) (arguing
for a heightened scrutiny for health care interests under the equal protection clause);
Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y, Winter 1993-94, at 77 (exploring the link between principles of dis
tributive justice, the Constitution, and the proper role of the courts, and arguing that
courts should playa larger role in redressing the current unjust distribution of health
care); Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role
of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 312-19 (1993) (using
social contract theory and early public health laws to argue that the framers of federal
constitution intended not only to empower but also to obligate the government to pro
vide for the public health).
11. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,55 (1973)(holding
that education is not a fundamental federal constitutional right, and precluding the pos
sibility of federal relief for inequitable funding of school systems). But cf Susan H.
Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution:
A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 553
(1992) (arguing that "[d]octrines interpreting the Constitution are rich with possible
theoretical bases for asserting an unenumerated affirmative right to education");
Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme
Court's Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 953 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
holding in Rodriguez).
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)(holding that Medicaid is not required to fund abortion services for indigent wo
man seeking to exercise reproductive choice); see also Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty
Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejecting federal constitutional right to
medical services). But cf Mariner, supra note 10, at 37 (criticizing the Supreme Court
for not acknowledging health care as constitutionally protected); Stacy, supra note 10, .
at 82-85 (same).
Under some circumstances, however, there is a federal statutory right to emer
gency medical care. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EM
TALA), 42 U.s.c. § 1395dd (1997) (obligating hospitals that participate in Medicare
and maintain emergency departments to screen and stabilize patients who suffer from
an emergency medical condition regardless of the patient's ability to pay).
12. See infra Part I, for a discussion of such litigation.
13. Since having adequate health insurance has become, in part, a prerequisite for
having access to doctors and hospitals in the United States, "access to health care," for
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constitutionalism and discusses how legal advocates have used state
constitutional law to expand the right to public education. Part II
identifies and analyzes both explicit and implicit health care provi
sions contained in state constitutions. It concludes that given the
paucity of these provisions, they would not be effective for ex
panding access to health care. A better strategy is to explore
whether a state's constitution contains a constitutional interest in
fair equality of opportunity.14 Part III provides a preliminary
sketch of a health care equal protection theory-that is a frame
work within which one could challenge a state's health care financ
ing laws under the state's equal protection clause. Finally, Part IV
tests this framework by applying it to Massachusetts' health care
financing laws. It concludes that these laws may violate the state's
equal protection guarantees because they unequally distribute ac
cess to health care, thereby burdening some residents' fair equality
of opportunity interests.
I.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

The current use of state constitutional law as a source for ex
panding individual rights is a relatively recent phenomenon. Most
scholars trace its origins to 1977 when Justice William Brennan
challenged state supreme courts to use their own constitutions to
expand individual rights in light of the United States Supreme
Court's conservative turn in the 1970s.15 Since his challenge, state
supreme courts have responded resoundingly. In the 1980s and
1990s, state courts issued over 350 rights-expanding decisions 16 in
purposes of this article, refers to "access to affordable health insurance." See infra Part
III.C.
14. Below "fair" equality of opportunity is distinguished from "formal" or "nega
tive" equality of opportunity. The latter protects opportunity by proscribing discrimi
nation based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender and so forth, while the former protects
opportunity by guaranteeing essential background conditions, such as access to educa
tional institutions, necessary for having a competitive chance at opportunities formally
open to all. See infra Part I1I.B.
15. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548
(1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977). For an excellent overview of state constitu
tionalism, see James A. Gardner, Introduction to 1 STATE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN A DUAL CONSTITUTIONAL Sys·
TEM, at ix, xi-xvii (James A. Gardner ed., 1999) and G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
16. See Gardner, supra note 15 at xxvii (citing Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions
Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 381, 397 (1987)).

2002]

UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE

331

areas such as criminal procedure,17 individual privacy,18 protection
for the mentally ill,19 abortion rights,20 and same-sex marriage
rights. 21
One of the most significant uses of state constitutional law has
been in the area of public school financing. 22 There, legal advocates
have used either a state constitution's equal protection c1ause23 or
its education c1ause24 to overcome large disparities in funding and
17. See Gardner, supra note 15, at xxv (noting that "state courts have been most
willing to chart ... independent course[s]" in the area of criminal procedure).
18. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501-02 (Ky. 1992) (providing
heightened protection for gay and lesbian intimate associations). See generally Ken
Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1279
(1992)(discussing a complete treatment of state constitutionality privacy guarantees).
19. See generally Antony B. Klapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitu
tions for Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739, 833-35
(1993) (urging the use of state constitutionalism to expand the rights of the mentally ill
in civil commitment procedures).
20. See Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 404 (Mass. 1981) (using
state's due process and equal protection clauses to hold that its restrictions on abortion
funding under Massachusetts' Medicaid program were unconstitutional). See generally
Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an Alternative Source
of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1993) (exploring
the use of state constitutions as an alternative or supplemental source for protecting
reproductive rights).
21. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont "is
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and pro
tections that -flow from marriage under Vermont law").
22. See, e.g., Kimberly J. Gost, Recent Case, Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267
(Conn. 1996),28 RUTGERS L.J. 909, 917 (1997) (discussing a state court decision that
found an obligation by the Connecticut legislature, under the State's Equal Protection
Clause, to remedy racial imbalances in the school system). See generally Allen W.
Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitu
tional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 121-27 (1989) (discussing state equal protection); Allen
W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 1325 (1992); William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of
State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1639, 1670-78 (1989) (discussing equality guaranty provisions in state
constitutions).
23. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. Number Thirty, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark.
1983)(using a state equal protection clause successfully in the area of public education
financing); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976)(same); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977)(same); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 511
N.W.2d 247, 262-63 (N.D. 1994)(same); Washakie County Sch. Dist. Number One v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 335-36 (Wyo. 1980)(same); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878
(W. Va. 1979)(same).
24. An education clause exists in every state constitution except Mississippi. See
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:
The Massachusetts Decision As a Model, 35 H.C. L. REV. 597,602 n.29 (1994) (citing
educational clauses from forty-nine states). These clauses require the state to maintain
a system of free public education. /d. States have used the education clause to strike
down disparate public school financing systems. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d
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educational quality between rich and poor school districts. 25
In 1993, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ("SJC") used the state's education clause to analyze public
school financing. In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of
Education,26 the SJC held that the Commonwealth of Massachu
setts has a constitutional obligation to provide all public school stu e
dents with an educationP Although the plaintiffs used an equal
protection analysis, the court, for the first time, focused on whether
the education clause itself required this action. By analyzing the
intentions of the framers, the language and structure of the consti
tution, and other sources, the SJC concluded that the education
clause was intended to mandate adequate education for all public
school students. 28
Likewise, in one of the earliest public school finance cases liti
gated under state constitutional law, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Robinson v. Cahill,29 declined to use the state's equal pro
tection language because it was uncomfortable in defining educa
tion as a fundamental righPO Instead the court used the education
clause of the state's constitution, which required the legislature to
107, 110-11 (Ala. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213-15
(Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555
(Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont.
1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
25. These two strategies have been described as separate waves of school finance
litigation, where the use of the equal protection clause, the second wave, has been less
successful than the use of the education clause, the third wave. The unsuccessful use of
the federal equal protection clause was the first wave. See Thro, supra note 24, at 600
04 (discussing the three waves in the context of comparing the methodology of
McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) with
other third wave decisions).
26. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
27. !d. at 548. But see Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095
(Mass. 1995) (holding that each individual student does not have a fundamental right to
an education while acknowledging the importance of education and that the Common
wealth has a general obligation to educate its children pursuant to McDuffy).
28. The education clause reads, in relevant part, "it shall be the duty of legisla
tures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the inter
ests of literature and the sciences ...." MASS. CONST. pt. 2 ch. 5, § 2. The defendants
argued that the phrase "shall be the duty...to cherish" was permissive language and not
obligatory. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 524.
29. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
30. The court was hesitant to find a fundamental right violation under its equal
protection clause in the context of education observing that "the equal protection
clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical answers in the
vast area of human needs, choosing those which must be met and a single basis upon
which the State must act." Id. at 283.
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maintain a "thorough and efficient" educational system. 31
Other state courts, however, have held that education is a fun
damental right and have used their state's equal protection clause
to strike down unequal public financing arrangements as unconsti
tutional.3 2 For example, in Serrano v. Priest,33 the California Su
preme Court held that education is. a fundamental right and that
inadequate funding in poor schools was denying this right to some
children in violation of the state's equal protection clause. 34 The
Serrano court's decision was predicated on its' belief that education
was a fundamental right because "[u]nequal education ... leads to
unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped abil
ity to participate in the social, cultural, and political activity of our
society."35 In other words, the court reasoned that meeting educa
tional needs plays a significant role in preserving a child's future
opportunities; it gives each child a fair chance at competing for jobs
and participating effectively in contemporary social life. Since this
important connection between educational needs and opportunity
exists, the court justified treating education as a fundamental
right. 36

II.
A.

HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Explicit "health" or "health care" provisions

While almost every state constitution has explicit language re
garding the provision of adequate education?? there is a paucity of
similar language regarding the provision of adequate health care
31. [d. at 295-97.
32. See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic
Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 271-78 (1999) (citing state courts holding educa
tion as fundamental right).
33. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
34. Id. at 1257-58. The court initially used the federal equal protection clause to
make its argument, but it later modified its decision to use the California Constitution
alone. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951-52 (Cal. 1977) (en banc) (modifiying its
decision due to San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
Some states have used their educational clause and their equal protection clause.
See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Mes
kill, 376 A.2d 359, 370-74 (Conn. 1977); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139, 152-56 (Tenn. 1993); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-66 (W. Va. 1979).
35. 487 P.2d at 1257 (quoting San Francisco United Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 478
P.2d 669, (Cal. 1971)).
36. See id. at 1258-59; see also DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 93 (noting that "[e]ducation
becomes the essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate,
claim, and effectively realize their established rights").
37. See supra note 24.
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services. Only eight state constitutions-Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan,
Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, South Carolina, and Wyo
ming-directly allocate to the state responsibility for promoting or
protecting health, or assisting the indigent sick. 38 Of these, six
states-Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, North Carolina, New York, and
Wyoming-have constitutional provisions requiring the legislature
to promote and protect the public health. 39 None of these states,
however, has interpreted such provision to mean that the state must
expand access to health care for the uninsured or underinsured. 40
These health promotion/protection provisions, presumably, author
ize state legislatures to protect the public health generally by man
dating vaccines, and regulating the environment, food, and safety,
etc. Nevertheless, since a population with inadequate health insur
ance may pose a public health problem, an advocate could use these
statutes to argue for increasing funding for state health insurance
programs. Unfortunately, even if successful, this strategy would
have limited application since only these six states have adopted
such provisions.
Other explicit state constitutional provisions require a legisla
38. See ALASKA CaNST. art. VII, § 4 ("[t]he legislature shall provide for the pro
motion and protection of public health"); HAW. CaNST. art. IX, § 3 ("The State shall
have the power to provide financial assistance, medical assistance and social services for
persons who are found to be in need of and are eligible for such assistance and services
as provided by law."), § 1 ("The State shall provide for the protection and promotion of
the public health."); MICH. CaNST. art. 4, § 51 ("The legislature shall pass suitable laws
for the protection and promotion of the public health ...."); MISS. CaNST. art. IV, § 86
("It shall be the duty of the legislature to provide by law for the treatment and care of
the insane; and the legislature may provide for the care of the indigent sick in the hospi
tals in the state ...."); N.C. CaNsT. art. XI § 4 ("Beneficient provisions for the poor,
the unfortunate and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian
state."); N.Y. CaNsT. art. 17, § 3 ("The protection and promotion of the health of the
inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and provision therefor shall be
made by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such
means as the legislature shall from time to time determine."); S.c. CaNsT. art. XII, § 1
("The health, welfare, and safety of the lives and property of the people of this State
and the conservation of its natural resources are matters of public concern. The Gen
eral Assembly shall provide appropriate agencies to function in these areas of public
concern and determine the activities, powers, and duties of such agencies."); WYa.
CaNsT. art. 7, § 20 ("As the health and. morality of the people are essential to their well
being, ... it shall be the duty of the legislature to protect and promote these vital
.
mterests.
. .. ") .
39. See sources cited supra note 38; see also LA. CaNsT. art. 12, § 8 ("The legisla
ture may establish a system of economic and social welfare, unemployment compensa
tion, and public health.").
40. A Michigan court, however, held that this language implicitly mandated the
provision of mental health services by the county health clinic. Coen v. Oakland
County, 400 N.W.2d 614; 615 (Mich. 1986) (per curiam).
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ture to fund health-related activities or target a specific population
for health care benefits. For example, Mississippi, Hawaii, and Ar
kansas require the legislature to pass laws for the treatment and
care of the insane. 41 However, both Mississippi's and Hawaii's pro
visions merely permit, but do not mandate, laws for the care of the
indigent sick in state hospitals. 42
Thus, an advocate has little explicit state constitutional lan
guage to rely on in attempting to expand individual rights to health
care. An alternative strategy, however, would be to look for im
plicit constitutional language such as welfare or similar assistance
provisions aimed at benefiting the poor generally. Since many
states have not expanded Medicaid to cover citizens who fall below
the federal poverty level,43 constitutional provisions to assist them
could require increasing access to health care services.
B.

Implicit Health Care Provisions

There are many other state constitutional provisions that could
be used indirectly to support increased access to health care. These
provisions do not mention promoting or protecting health, or pro
viding health care services per se, but they do contain beneficent or
welfare language that may be used to support increasing access to
health care for those who cannot afford it.44 For example, a North
41. See ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 19 ("It shall be the duty of the General Assembly
to provide by law for the support of institutions for the education of the deaf and dumb
and the blind, and also for the treatment of the insane."); HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 2
("The State shall have the power to provide for the treatment and rehabilitation of
handicapped persons."); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86.
42. See HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86; cf GA. CONST. art. 3,
§ 9, 'II VI (i) (authorizing the General Assembly to provide an Indigent Care Trust Fund,
where moneys in the fund are to be used exclusively for primary health care programs
for the state's medically indigent citizens and children, for expanding Medicaid eligibil
ity and services, or for programs to support those efforts that disproportionately serve
the medically indigent).
43. Only seven states-Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Vermont (and the District of Columbia)-have Medicaid earnings
thresholds that are at least equal to the federal poverty level ($13,650 a year for a family
of three in 1998). See Jocelyn Guyer & Cindy Mann, Employed But Not Insured: A
State-by-State Analysis of the Number of Low-Income Working Parents Who Lack
Health Insurance 2 (Feb. 9, 1999), available at http://www.cbpp.orgl2-9-99mcaid.htm.
44. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the legislature to re
quire the several counties of this state to make adequate provisions for the maintenance
of the poor."); Atkins v. Curtis, 66 So. 2d 455, 458 (Ala. 1953) (per curiam) (holding
that the Alabama legislature has the power to determine who constitutes the "poor");
see also ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 5 ("The legislature shall provide for public wel
fare"); ARIZ. CONST. art. 22, § 15 ("Reformatory and penal institutions, and institutions
for the benefit of the insane, blind, deaf, and mute, and such other institutions as the
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Carolina court interpreted the state's constitutional provision re
quiring "beneficent provisions for the poor" to include medical
treatment, without cost, to the indigent sick. 45 Moreover, Ala
bama's constitutional provision requiring counties of the state "to
make adequate provisions for the maintenance of the poor" has
been interpreted to support the constitutionality of the Alabama
Health Care Responsibility Act, which, inter alia, imposed financial
responsibility for the medical care of county indigents upon the
county itself.46
Given that there are twenty-three states that have some form
of constitutional provision for assisting the poor,47 this strategy of
fers more potential than relying on explicit health-related state con
stitutional provisions. Unfortunately, only four of the twenty-three
state provisions contain mandatory language. 48 Moreover, many
state courts limit the effectiveness of these poverty provisions bepublic good may require, shall be established and supported by the State in such man
ner as may be prescribed by law .... "); IDAHO CONST. art. X, § 1 (same); KAN. CONST.
art. VII, § 1 ("Institutions for the benefit of mentally or physically incapacitated or
handicapped persons, and such other benevolent institutions as the public good may
require, shall be fostered and supported by the state."); id. § 4 ("The respective coun
ties of the state shall provide ... for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity
or other misfortune, may have claims upon the aid of society."); MONT. CONST. art XII,
§ 3(3) ("The legislature may provide such economic assistance and social and rehabili
tative services for those who, by reason of the age, infirmities, or misfortune are deter
mined by the legislature to be in need."); N.Y. CONST. art. 17, § 1 ("The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state...."),
discussed in Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977)(interpreting the New York
constitutional provision as mandatory); N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 ("Beneficent provi
sions for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civi
lized and Christian state."); TEX. CONT. art. 16, § 8 ("Each county in the State may
provide, in such manner as may be prescribed by law ... for taking care of, managing,
employing and supplying the wants of its indigent and poor inhabitants ....").
45. Graham V. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 485, 491 (N.C. 1968); cf Bayne V.
Sec'y of State, 392 A.2d 67, 72-73 (Md. 1978) (finding that provision of medical services
for indigent persons is a primary function of government and an appropriation to carry
out that function is not an appropriation for "maintaining the State Government," so as
to invoke the referendum limitation of MD. CONST. art. 16, § 2).
46. See Bd. of Comm'rs V. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 483 So. 2d 1365, 1366
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Marengo County V. Univ. of S. Ala., 479 So. 2d 48, 51 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1985); see also Childree V. Health Care Auth., 548 So. 2d 419, 421 (Ala. 1989)(per
curiam) (holding county financially responsible for indigents who were subject to invol
untarily commitment proceedings).
47. See William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 543, 554 & n.99, 555 & n.114, 557 & n.127, 558 & n.138 (1998) (analyzing state
constitutional welfare protections for the poor and finding that there are twenty-three
states with welfare provisions for the poor, where four provide a mandatory duty, four a
permissive grant, four a broad grant of power, and eleven an implied grant of power).
48. Id. at 554 & n.99.
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cause they apply a very deferential rational basis review when adju
dicating claims of welfare assistance under these provisions. 49 Thus,
state legislatures are given a great deal of latitude in designing the
nature and scope of their assistance programs.
III.

A THEORY OF HEALTH CARE EQUAL PROTECTION FOR

STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Unlike education, then, there is little explicit or implicit textual
basis in state constitutions for expanding access to health care ser
vices. Yet, in education financing litigation, legal advocates were
successful in some states using state equal protection language. 5o
Part III, therefore, develops a theory of equal protection for health
care-a legal framework within which one can challenge a state's
health care financing laws using a state's equal protection
guarantees.
Part liLA provides an overview of state equal protection law
and explains why it may be a powerful tool for expanding access to
health care. Part III.B argues that, assuming one can interpret a
state constitution to protect fair equality of opportunity, having
one's health care needs met is an interest that deserves heightened
state constitutional scrutiny. This is demonstrated by relying, in
part, on Norman Daniels' analysis of how meeting health care
needs protects a person's normal opportunity range, i.e., the range
of life plans otherwise open to a person but for his unmet health
care needs. 51 Protecting one's normal opportunity range is, in turn,
essential for protecting fair equality of opportunity.
Part III.C analyzes the relationship between health insurance,
access to hospitals and doctors, and a person's well-being. This
analysis explains the connection between having health insurance
and preventing, restoring, and maintaining one's normal opportu
nity range. Finally, Part III.D examines how a state government's
role in financing health insurance and/or health care may violate
the state's equal protection clause. This section argues that once
the state undertakes to finance health insurance, it must do so in a
constitutionally neutral manner so as not to exclude any constitu
49. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1132, 1170-71 (1999) (questioning the
reasons-democratic legitimacy, federalism, and separation of powers-for using fed
eral rationality review in state court adjudication of claims to welfare assistance under
state constitution poverty clauses).
50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
51. See infra pp. 20-23.
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tionally protected options. If a state constitution protects fair
equality of opportunity, then it should protect, to some degree, a
resident's normal opportunity range. A state's decision to help
some, but not all, of its residents gain access to health care will ex
clude or shrink part of one's normal opportunity range otherwise
available, thereby violating the state's equal protection clause.
A.

State Equal Protection Law

Currently, the Supreme Court applies the federal equal protec
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment52 to cases where state
law infringes upon one's fundamental right,53 or when it discrimi
nates against a suspect classification. 54 In either case, the court will
subject the law to strict scrutiny review, requiring the government
to show that the law is necessary to promote a compelling state in
terest. 55 Under this reVIew, state laws are presumptively
unconstitutional.
Typically, if the court finds that the state law does not discrimi
nate based on a suspect classification or impinge upon a fundamen
tal right, it subjects the law to a rational basis standard of review.
The government is required merely to show that the law is ration
ally related to a legitimate state interest. 56 Under this review, the
state law is presumptively constitutional. Thus, when one chal
lenges a state law for interfering with an individual's rights, the
Court will use one of two standards only, either strict scrutiny or
rational basis review, depending on whether the Court finds a fun
damental right at stake.57
Except for Delaware and Mississippi, every state's highest
court has held that its respective state constitution guarantees equal
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
53. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (fundamental right to
travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry whomever one wants);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to privacy).
54. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967) (suspect classification of race); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (national origin).
55. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (holding that the challenged state action must be
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest").
56. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979).
57. The Court will review a state law that discriminates based on a quasi-suspect
classification like gender under a slightly lower, but still heightened, standard. Under
this standard, the law is constitutional if it is substantially related to an important state
interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
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protection under the law. 58 In many instances, state courts have
chosen to interpret their respective equal protection guarantees
identically, or similarly, to how the Supreme Court interprets the
federal equal protection clause. 59 Under this so-called "lock-step"
approach, state equal protection law provides a state resident with
the same protection as the Constitution. It does so because the
state courts conform to federal precedent when interpreting the
same language, including the equal protection clause. 60
However, states are free to go beyond the Fourteenth Amend
ment and provide their residents more protection by interpreting
their equal protection guarantees more expansively than the Su
preme Court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 By one esti
mate, twenty-one states have "explicitly held that their states' equal
protection affords greater protections" than the Constitution. 62
Among these states, some afford greater protections because their
respective state equal protection clause contains explicit language
expanding the categories of classes of persons protected. 63 For ex
ample, the Massachusetts Constitution specifies, unlike the Consti
58. See Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 251-52 (documenting that state courts have de
rived equal protection from a variety of different state constitutional provisions such as
"provisions guaranteeing equal protection, equality, due process, or variations on due
process; provisions prohibiting the state from granting special privileges or immunities,
denying privileges or immunities, or enacting local or special laws; or a combination of
provisions") (footnotes omitted); see also Jason W. Hayes, Amendment One: The Ne·
braska Equal Protection Clause, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 618-26 (1998) (surveying
state equal protection clauses from across the country and categorizing them with reo
spect to differences in language and legal effect).
59. See Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 254-57 (finding that "twenty-seven states have
explicitly held that their states' equal protection guarantees are identical, or essentially
identical, to that of federal equal protection (seven states), or that the tests, standards
or approaches are the same (nine states), or that the protections are similar (seven
states), or simply have consistently applied federal standards in adjudicating state equal
protection claims (four states)") (footnotes omitted).
60. See 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVID·
UAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1-6(b) (3rd ed. 2000) (explaining that "[l]ock
step is a term used to describe an interpretive approach that conforms the meaning of
state clauses to the prevailing federal rule for counterpart federal clauses"); see also
Robert F. Williams, Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitutional
Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675, 678
(1992) (criticizing the lock-step approach since it "inevitably treats the state constitu
tion as having no legal effect" and citing a wide range of judicial and academic com
mentators critical of the lock-step approach).
61. See FRIESEN, supra note 60, § 1-6 (discussing independent state
constitutionalism).
62. Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 254 & n.67.
63. See Hayes, supra note 58, at 622-23 & n.53 (citing thirteen states that define
suspect classes in their equal protection clauses under which courts apply heightened
scrutiny).
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tution, that "[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."64
Because of this language, Massachusetts' equal protection clause
provides more protection against gender discrimination than the
Federal Equal Protection Clause. 65
Other states, however, interpret their equal protection clause
more expansively by deciding not to follow the Supreme Court's
interpretation of similar constitutional language and by not being
constrained by federal precedent. For example, some states use an
"interstitial" or "supplemental" interpretive approach when apply
ing their state constitution. 66 Under this approach, the state court
treats current federal law as "the presumptively current standard
for state law as well, except when the state court finds persuasive
reasons to 'depart' or 'diverge' from the Supreme Court, or fill the
'gaps' left by its opinions."67
An even more expansive approach is the "primacy" approach
to state constitutional interpretation. 68 Under this approach, a state
court treats "federal doctrine regarding parallel constitutional inter
ests as relevant, but not binding. Supreme Court decisions have no
more weight than opinions from sister states construing a similar
clause."69 Importantly, under this approach "state constitutional
questions should be addressed first, and. . .in approaching these
questions state courts should treat state constitutions as free-stand
ing, wholly independent sources of positive, constitutional law."70
Understanding these interpretive approaches can help a legal
advocate predict when and if a state court might go beyond federal
precedent to thus expand individual rights to health care. When
urging a state court to expand its equal protection guarantee, a legal
advocate mil!ht emolov one of the following strategies.
First, he or she might identify whether the state's equal protec
'-'

L.I

..............

64. MASS. CONST. art. CVI; see Murphy v. Comm'r of Dep't of Indus. Accidents,
612 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Mass. 1993). The Fourteenth Amendment merely says " ... nor
shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. See Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977).
66. See FRIESEN, supra note 60, § 1-6(c); Gardner, supra note 15, at xxx.
67. Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 15, at xxx (stating that the supplemental
approach holds that the "state courts should turn to the state constitution only after it
becomes apparent that the United States Constitution provides inadequate
protection").
68. See FRIESEN, supra note 60, § 1-6(a); Gardner, supra note 15, at xxx.
69. FRIESEN, supra note 60, § 1-6(a) (footnotes omitted).
70. Gardner, supra note 15, at xxx.
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tion clause either explicitly (with text) or implicitly (through inter
pretation) has gone beyond the federal list of suspect classifications
to include gender and disability. The advocate would then argue
that poverty or uninsurance 71 deserves to be added to this list-if
not as a suspect class, rather as a quasi-suspect class deserving
heightened scrutiny.72 Although no state has done this so far, states
which have already expanded their equal protection language may
be more amenable to this strategy than others.
Another strategy would be to argue that access to health care
institutions, or health itself, is a fundamental right, and the state
must protect that right by enacting universal health care legisla
tion.73 One New Jersey court, for example, held that health is a
fundamental right under the New Jersey Constitution because of
the state's long history of providing for its residents' health.7 4 In
fact, in 1988, the Massachusetts legislature made a finding that ac
cess to basic health care services is a natural, essential, and inaliena
ble right under the Massachusetts Constitution, which provides
generally for inalienable rights to enjoying and defending one's life
and liberty.75 However, it has since repealed that finding. 76 Never
theless, since a number of states include similar inalienable rights
language,77 an advocate could argue that access to health care is a
71. Instead of arguing that wealth is a suspect class, one might argue that the
uninsured are constructively disabled since lacking access to health care institutions is
functionally equivalent to being disadvantaged at no fault of one's own, assuming one
has not genuinely chosen to not have insurance.
72. See, e.g., Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 33-39 (1969) (arguing for a governmental
duty of minimal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). One might use
Michelman's arguments but apply them to more flexible state equal protection clauses.
73. See Stacy, supra note 10, at 83 (stating that other fundamental rights cases
support the idea of equal access to public institutions that affect "life opportunities").
74. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 405 A.2d 427, 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1979) (holding that restrictions on abortion funding under Medicaid violated a funda
mental right to health under the state constitution). But see Right to Choose v. Byrne,
450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982) (declining "to proceed as far as the Chancery Division in
declaring" health to be a fundamental right).
75. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I (proclaiming that "[a]1I people are born free and
equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties ... in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118F, § 1
(repealed 1996) (stating that "the access of residents of the commonwealth to basic
health care services is a natural, essential, and unalienable right which is protected by
Article I of Part the First of the Constitution").
76. In 1996, the Massachusetts legislature repealed the 1988 Mass. Medical Secur
ity Act, which contained this finding. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118F, § 2 (repealed
1996).
77. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1875 art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; CAL.
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prerequisite for securing such generally protected rights.
Third, even if access to health care is not a fundamental right,
an advocate could argue that access to health care is an important
interest because it is a vital prerequisite for exercising other consti
tutionally protected interestsJ8 Like education, access to health
care is essential for providing individuals with a fair chance at com
peting for jobs, careers, and public offices legally open to all. If a
state constitution goes beyond protecting against discrimination
based on race, gender, religion, and national origin, and protects
opportunity against unfair competition for jobs and offices, one
could argue that once a state undertakes to provide access to health
care, providing it unequally violates equal protection. The govern
ment would not be acting neutrally when distributing resources nec
essary for exercising opportunity interests. Given health care's role
in protecting opportunity, one could try to convince a state court to
go beyond the federal two-level analysis of fundamental rights vio
lations and apply a middle-level review to laws interfering with op
portunity interests.79 It is this third strategy that this Article will
explore below. 80
B.

The "Special" Importance of Meeting Health Care Needs

To employ this strategy, it is necessary to explain why access to
health care is important. Health care's importance derives, in part,
from its role in preventing, maintaining, and restoring one's normal
opportunity range. Unmet health care needs, in other words,
shrink the range of opportunities otherwise available to an individ
ual and therefore undermine one's share of opportunities formally
open to all.
Having one's health care needs met today is different than at
any other time in our history. As the political philosopher Michael
art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. 1,
art. 1, § I; IOWA CaNST. art. I, § 1; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1; Ky.
CONST. § 1; ME. CONST. art. I, § I; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2
("inherent rights"); N.J. CONST. art. I, 'II 1; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. 1,
§ 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2 ("inherent rights"); OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("inherent
rights"); PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("inherent rights"); S.D. CONST. art. VI § 1 ("inherent
rights"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("inherent rights").
78. See Mariner, supra note 10, at 349 (defending a new heightened scrutiny for
analyzing claims of unequal access to health care which "may be especially suitable to
the review of equal protection claims under state constitutional provisions").
79. See Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 257-59 (offering various methods of adjudicating
state equal protection challenges).
80. By pursuing this third strategy, I do not mean to suggest that the other two
are less viable or incorrect; in fact, I hope others pursue them as well.
CONST.

§ I;

IND. CaNST.
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Walzer has aptly noted, "[d]octors and hospitals have become such
massively important features of contemporary life that to be cut off
from the help they provide is not only dangerous but also degrad
ing."81 Currently, doctors and hospitals can do tremendous things
towards preventing, maintaining, and restoring health. For exam
ple, medical personnel can prevent fatal cancer through early detec
tion and treatment; they can cure infections with antibiotics; they
can prevent a myriad of otherwise debilitating or fatal diseases
through vaccination and early detection; and they can manage
chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, and arthritis,
among others.
Philosopher Norman Daniels has defended health care needs
as "special" by analyzing the relationship between unmet health
care needs and their impact on opportunity.82 By "special," he
means that society should treat preferences for health care differ
ently from other kinds of preferences, because unmet health care
needs adversely impact opportunity.83 The following explains Dan
iels' theory of health care needs and shows its relevance for the
argument that follows.
Norman Daniels, in Just Health Care, extends moral and politi
cal philosopher John Rawls' theory of justice to develop an inde
pendent theory of justice for health care distribution. 84 His theory
has two parts. The first part is descriptive; it explains the central
function of health care, which reveals its special importance com
pared to other needs or wants we may have. The second part is
normative; it connects the central function of health care to Rawls'
fair equality of opportunity principle and argues that society should
meet health care needs to the extent it has an obligation to guaran
tee fair equality of opportunity. This Article focuses on Daniel's
theory of health care needs, that is, the first part of his theory.
"[W]e must talk about health-care needs," Daniels argues, "if
we are to explain what is special about health care ...."85 Moreo
ver, a theory of health care needs will explain why we believe some
kinds of health care are more special than others and why health
81. WALZER, supra note 2, at 89.
82. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 19-35 (1985).
83. See id. at 23-26.
84. See id. at 42-48. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 3, 11,
46 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that principles of justice are fair when chosen under condi
tions of equality and that this would include a principle of fair equality of opportunity,
which imposes an obligation on society to provide resources necessary for individuals to
compete fairly for jobs and offices).
85. DANIELS, supra note 82, at 23.
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care is more special than other social goods. He argues that an
analysis of the relationship between ill health and opportunity will
explain the special importance of health care needs.
Daniels claims that preferences for certain categories of needs
should be given special weight. In particular, we should give special
weight to needs that are "necessary for maintaining normal func
tioning for individuals, viewed as members of a natural species. "86
Health care fits into this category of important needs because it is
needed "to prevent or cure diseases, which are deviations from nor
mal functional organization. "87 In other words, meeting health care
needs helps prevent, maintain, or restore deviations from normal
species functioning. Maintaining normal species functioning, in
turn, is crucial for preventing, maintaining, or restoring what Dan
iels calls one's "normal opportunity range."88 One's "normal op
portunity range," according to Daniels, is "the array of life plans
reasonable persons in [their society] are likely to construct for
themselves."89 Although one's normal opportunity range is relative
to key features of a society-for example, its material wealth and
technological development "and even important cultural facts
about it" (attitudes toward family and careers)-normal species
functioning, Daniels contends, "provides us with one clear parame
ter affecting the share of the normal range open to a given individ
ual."90 Importantly, "[i]t is this parameter which the distribution of
health care affects."91 As Daniels aptly summarizes:
[N]ormal species-typical functioning provides us with one clear
parameter relevant to determining what share of the normal
range is open to a given individual holding constant, for the mo
ment, the individual's skills and talents. Impairments of normal
functioning through disease and disability constitute a fundamen
tal restriction on individual opportunity relative to that portion of
the normal range which the individual's particular skills and tal
ents would ordinarily have made available to him.92

My approach abstracts a central function of health care, the
maintenance of species-typical functional organization and func
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Norman Daniels, Fair Equality of Opportunity and Decent Minimums: A Re
ply to Buchanan, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 106, 107-08 (1985) (emphasis added).
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tion, and notes its central effect on opportunity. Specifically, dis
eases, in different ways and to different degrees, impair the
opportunity available to an individual, relative to the normal oppor
tunity range for his society. It is this effect on quality of life that
makes health care more "special" than many other things which en
hance life quality.93
The special importance of health care needs, then, arises from
the connection between ill health and achieving or maintaining
one's normal opportunity range. Meeting health care needs is one
very important way of mitigating the adverse affects that disease
and disability have on our normal opportunity range. Since people
have a strong interest in protecting their normal opportunity range,
they ascribe special importance to meeting health care needs. 94
Daniels' account of the "specialness" of health care needs is
not perfect. For example, illness and diseases produce other major
misfortunes besides loss of opportunities such as death, acute and
chronic pain, and suffering generally, which can account for the
specialness of health and health care irrespective of any lost oppor
tunities. 95 Moreover, "[i]mpairment of species-typical activity does
not always coincide with constriction of a person's opportunity
compared to the normal opportunity range of his society."96 A cer
tain degree of impairment may be normal for a society, or we may
want to alleviate what is species-typical. For example, some cancer
and diseases resulting from an aging immune system are species
93. Id. at 107.
94. This strong interest in protecting or restoring opportunity is evidenced by our
society's strong and widespread laws proscribing discrimination based on disability and
requiring reasonable accommodations to allow disabled individuals to participate in ac
tivities and employment they would have otherwise been unable to do. See, e.g., Archi
tectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.s.c. §§ 4151-4157 (1994) (requiring buildings
constructed with federal funds or leased by the federal government to be accessible to
people with disabilities); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.c. §§ 791-796 (1994 &
Supp. 1999) (mandating nondiscrimination and affirmative action by federal employers
and for federal contractors and mandating nondiscrimination and reasonable accommo
dations by recipients of federal assistance, including education programs, public facili
ties, transportation, and health and welfare services); Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.c. §§ 1401-1456 (1994 & Supp. 1999), now known as the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), 47 U.S.c. §§ 225,611 (1994) (proscribing
discrimination and mandating reasonable accommodations in private employment (Ti
tle I), state and local services (Title II), public accommodations privately operated (Ti
tle III), and in telecommunications (Title IV».
95. See Lawrence Stern, Opportunity and Health Care: Criticisms and Suggestions,
8 J. MED. & PHIL. 339, 346-49 (1983).
96. Id. at 345.
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typical; these would fall outside the scope of special health care
needs. 97 And finally, making normal species-function the central
goal of health care could produce overly demanding policies if ful
filling this goal requires us "to bring individuals closer to the ideal
of normal species functioning-which is nothing less than a life free
of disease and disability, since the latter are defined as departures
from normal species functioning."98
Nevertheless, this account captures the shared intuitive idea
that unmet health care needs, in part, adversely impact one's range
of opportunities for one's society. In addition, it captures the
shared assumption that, for our society at least, people have a
strong interest in protecting opportunities that would have been
open to them had they had access to health care services. 99 The fact
that premature death and acute and chronic pain are also linked to
unmet health care needs provides more, not less, evidence of its
special importance.
Assuming, then, that health care's "specialness" is tied, in part,
to its role in protecting one's normal opportunity range, it is then
necessary to determine whether a state's constitution protects its
citizens' normal opportunity range and to what extent. Before this
question is explored in the context of the Massachusetts Constitu
tion, this Article examines the relationships among health insur
ance, access to medical services, and individual well-being to
explain the role of health insurance in protecting one's normal op
portunity range.

C.

The Importance of Providing Affordable Health Insurance
A fundamental criterion for accessing the United States' health
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personnel and veterans). Some individuals pay for health care ser
vices directly (i.e., out of pocket). Most people, however, pay for
health care services indirectly by using some form of health insur
ance. Currently, the United States, and each state, offer a public
private mix of health insurance plans in which one obtains health
insurance in one of four ways: (1) through employer-subsidized pri
vate insurance, which accounts for about 58% of the population; (2)
See id. at 351.
Allen Buchanan, Health-Care Delivery and Resource Allocation, in MEDICAL
ETHICS 291, 315 (Robert M. Veatch ed. 1989); see also, Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to
a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55, 62-66 (1984) (criticizing
Daniels' approach in the context of defending a right to health care).
99. See sources cited supra note 94.
97.
98.

2002]

UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE

347

through self-purchased private insurance, which accounts for about
4% of the population; (3) through Medicare, the government insur
ance program for the elderly and disabled, which accounts for
about 12 % of the population; or (4) through Medicaid, the coopera
tive state and federal program that provides medical assistance for
the poor, which accounts for about 9% of the population.1°O Ac
counting for the changing unemployment rates, and the changing
eligibility status of persons using public insurance, about 15% of the
population remains uninsured,101 and about 10% under-uninsured
throughout the United States. 102
Thus, the key to one's ability to pay for health care is having
some form of adequate health insurance coverage.1°3 Today, health
insurance status "is probably the most important factor determining
the allocation of health care ...."104 Insurance status determines
not only one's ability to access doctors and hospitals, but also the
amount and quality of medical care these institutions will
provide. 105
Consider the following actual cases. Pat McFarland severely
injured three fingers in a machine he used for customizing automo
bile parts. He was rushed to a nearby private hospital and forced to
wait three hours "while emergency room doctors tried to make ar
rangements to get him transferred to ... the county hospital."106
100. See THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING
HEALTH POLICY 22 (2d ed. 1998). Approximately 2% of the population receives insur
ance through active military service or the Department of Veterans Affairs. See id.
101. Id.
102. Pamela Farley Short, PhD & Jessica S. Banthin, PhD, New Estimates of the
Underinsured Younger Than 65 Years, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1302, 1305-06 (1995)
(estimating that twenty-nine million people are underinsured).
103. There are, of course, significant non-economic barriers to accessing health
care, e.g., cultural and language barriers, among others. See John Billings, Access to
Health Care Services, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
8, at 401, 414. By far the most significant barrier is economic and therefore the focus of
this section. See id. at 404.
104. Stacy, supra note 10, at 78.
105.- See John Z. Ayanian, MD, MPP et al., Unmet Health Needs of Uninsured
Adults in the United States, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2061, 2061 (2000) (concluding that
"long-term-uninsured [more than one year] adults reported much greater unmet health
needs than insured adults" and that providing them access "could have substantial
clinical benefits"); see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONGo OF THE U.S., DOES
HEALTH INSURANCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?-BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (1992) (conclud
ing that there is a relationship between health insurance status and access to-and types
and amounts-of services one receives); Billings, supra note 103, at 409.
106. Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing Before the Sub
comm. on Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 100th Congo 271 (1987) [hereinafter Equal Access].
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Pat McFarland did not have health insurance. He finally received
treatment eleven hours later at the county hospital, but it was too
late. Doctors had to amputate two fingers and two-thirds of
another. 107
Like Pat McFarland, William Jenness did not have health insur
ance when he needed it most. After being involved in a car acci
dent, he was immediately taken by ambulance to the nearest
hospital where he was diagnosed with a tear in his aorta. "How
ever, once it was determined that he had no medical insurance and
could not make the required $1,000 deposit, the hospital made ar
rangements for him to be transferred to the county hospital. "108
This was done despite the family's attempt to convince the hospital
to accept partial payment or a credit card. "Four hours elapsed be
tween the time of the accident and Mr. Jenness' arrival at the
county hospital. A surgical team ... struggled to patch five tears in
Mr. Jenness' heart. Two and a half hours later, Mr. Jenness died in
surgery. An autopsy report said that almost a quart of blood was
found in his chest. "109
These cases were among numerous others documented in Cali
fornia in 1985-87 and reported in a hearing before the United States
House ~f Representatives in 1987. These hearings were held in re
sponse to "the continuing problem of patient dumping."llo Al
though illegal by 1987,111 hospitals continued to refuse "to treat an
107. Id.
108. Id. at 273.
109. Id. Consider also the story of Sharon Ford. About to deliver, Sharon Ford
sought treatment at a private hospital. However, when the hospital learned that she
was enrolled in an insurance program that the hospital did not have a contract with,
they refused to admit her. She then went to another private hospital that accepted her
insurance and preliminary tests showed that the fetus was in trouble. However, because
of a computer mistake, the hospital could not find evidence of her insurance coverage.
Although the fetus was in danger, she was told that "unless she had her insurance card,
she would have to make her way to ... the county hospital." Id. at 271. When the
father finally found her insurance card, he was told that the county hospital was already
called and that they should proceed there. "Barely half an hour after she arrived at [the
county hospital] the baby was born dead. The [hospital's] obstetrician said it appeared
that the baby was dying slowly during Ms. Ford's 3-hour search for care." [d.
110. Id. at 7. Patient dumping is "the refusal of hospitals, usually private hospi
tals, to treat patients in need of emergency care ... because of their inability to pay."
Andrew Jay McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against
Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 174 (1989).
111. In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active La
bor Act, which requires any hospital with an emergency department receiving Medicare
funds to treat any person who comes into their emergency room with an emergency
medical condition regardless of their ability to pay. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 1395dd(b)-(c)
(1994).
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emergency patient, even though the hospital [was] physically capa
ble of doing so, simply because the patient [was] unable to pay."112
Congress enacted an "anti-dumping" law in 1986 in the face of
"the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms
are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if
the patient does not have medical insurance."113 Some estimated
that about "300,000 Americans are refused care each year at hospi
tal Emergency Departments because they are uninsured or inade
quately insured."114 An analysis of the 1987 National Medical
Expenditures Survey, which collected demographic, health status,
and medical care use and expenditure data on about 30,000 people,
suggested that nearly one million people "failed to get emergency
care, of whom half actively sought it."115
In 1992, in the context of a growing "crisis" in the United
States' health insurance system, the United States Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment, studied the connection between having
adequate health insurance and receiving necessary medical care.1 16
Entitled "Does Health Insurance Make a Difference?," the study
evaluated "all the available literature" on this question and con
cluded that "[r]esearch conducted in the last decade supports the
common-sense notion that having or lacking health insurance cover
age is related to gaining access to services, to the types, quality and
intensity of the care that is delivered, and, logically, to patient
health."117
112.
1990).
113.

See Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (N.D. Ill.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(1), at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 605
(emphasis added); see also Elliott B. Oppenheim, A Review of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 85 ILL. B.l. 212, 213-14 (1997) (noting that the law was
intended to prevent economic discrimination, that is, to prevent hospitals from shunting
off unprofitable patients).
114. David Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Care Denied: US Residents Who
Are Unable to Obtain Needed Medical Services, 85 AM. 1. PUB. HEALTH 341, 343 (1995).
115. Id. at 343; see also David A. Ansell, MD & Robert L. Schiff, MD, Patient
Dumping: Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 1. AM. MED. Ass'N
1500, 1500 (1987).
116. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 105.
117. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 105, at 2 (emphasis added).
Overall the Office of Technical Assessments' ("OTA") "key findings" suggested (1)
that an uninsured person was 3 times more likely than a privately insured person to use
less medical care, to receive inadequate medical care, and to have negative health out
comes; (2) that the uninsured were 1.3 times more likely than publicly insured individu
als [e.g., Medicaid) to access health care services and 1.5 times more likely to receive
inadequate care; and (3) that the publicly insured person was up to 2.5 times more
likely than a privately insured person to receive inadequate care and 4 times more likely
to have negative health outcomes. Id.
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In 1996 the Harvard School of Public Health conducted a na
tional survey of almost four thousand Americans, one of the largest
studies to date, that confirmed this vital connection between health
insurance and well-being. 118 Overall, the study found that forty
eight million Americans have problems getting or paying for
needed care, as twenty million are uninsured and twenty-eight mil
lion have inadequate coverage. 119 Specifically, the study deter
mined that the uninsured "were 4 times more likely than the
insured to report an episode of needing and not getting medical
care and 3 times more likely to report a problem in paying for med
ical bills."120 Moreover, 79% of those individuals reporting diffi
culty 10 obtaining medical treatment "point to senous
consequences."121
Insurance status, then, is the key to accessing health care insti
tutions; it determines the quantity and quality of services one will
receive. Since access to health care institutions is intricately con
nected to one's health insurance status, it follows that having ade
quate health insurance plays a significant role in protecting one's
well-being, and in protecting, maintaining, and restoring one's nor
mal opportunity range. With over forty million people uninsured,
and about twenty-nine million underinsured throughout the nation,
millions of Americans are at risk of not receiving the medical care
Some specific studies that the OTA reviewed found that (1) the uninsured are "less
likely than privately insured individuals to have a usual source of care ... , use preven
tive services ... , visit a physician ... , and be hospitalized ... ," and they are "more
likely to report that they have not received needed care ... ;" (2) that the uninsured
are up to 4 times as likely as the privately insured "to require both avoidable hospital
izations and emergency hospital care," which was consistent with their self-reports
about putting off going to the doctor when they needed care; (3) that uninsured patients
may be up to twice as likely to be at risk of dying when they reach the hospital door;
and (4) even when care is not initially delayed, uninsured patients admitted to the hos
pital "have been found to be half as likely as insured patients to receive certain high
cost (but not necessarily more appropriate and effective) procedures." Id. at 2-3.
118. Karen Donelan et aI., Whatever Happened to the Health Insurance Crisis in
the United States?: Voices from a National Survey, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1346 (1996).
For example, in one randomly chosen verbatim account, an uninsured individual de
scribed his difficulties getting care: "I need a specific medicine [for my multiple sclero
sis] that lessens the exacerbations of the disease and 1 can't afford to get it. It's very
frustrating and makes me angry because I'm progressing in my disease without the
medicine that could possibly slow it up." Id. at 1349. The authors note the real signifi
cance of their study: "The voices of the people that we surveyed give life to the statistics
and tell us a story of millions of individual crises in getting and paying for health care
each year." Id.
119. [d. at 1350.
120. [d. at 1347.
121. [d. at 1349.
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they need. 122
D.

How State Health Care Financing Laws "Interfere" with
One's Normal Opportunity Range

State governments playa major role in financing health care
and health insurance for their respective residents. 123 Every state
has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program124 and some, like
Massachusetts, have gone beyond the minimum federal standards
and expanded the program to reach residents whose income is
200% of the federal poverty level. 125
No state, however, guarantees universal access to health care.
Each state contains various patchwork quilts of Medicaid coverage,
community health centers, uncompensated care pools, and a myriad
of targeted programs. 126 At best, some states like Hawaii, Minne
sota, and Wisconsin have uninsured rates averaging less than 10%
of the population; at worst, some states like Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, Arkansas, and California have uninsured rates between 20
- 25%.127 Even within the best states, however, variations in the
uninsured are still significant. For example, in Wisconsin, where
7.9% of the population was uninsured in 1995-96, county level rates
varied from 4.0% to 17.0% in 1994.128
Given that each state has chosen to undertake a significant re
sponsibility in helping its residents access medical care, and given
the connection between access, well-being, and opportunity, does
leaving hundreds of thousands of residents without health insurance
122. See BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 100, at 21; Short & Banthin,
supra note 102, at 1302.
123. See National Health Law Program, State and Local Responsibility for Indi
gent Health Care, at http://nhelp.orglpublications.shtml#state (Nov. 8, 1997) (detailing
public insurance and assistance programs for all fifty states); Guyer & Mann, supra note
43, at 3.
124. A state is not required to participate in the Medicaid program, but if it does
then it must comply with the Federal Medical Act and its implementing regulations. See
42 U.S.c.A. §§ 1396-1397f (1992 & Supp. 2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 430-430.104 (2000).
125. See infra Part IV.A for a description of the Massachusetts Medicaid pro
gram. See generally, National Health Law Program, supra note 123.
126. See National Health Law Program, supra note 123. Uncompensated care
pools reimburse hospitals and community health centers for providing free care to re
sidents that have no source of health insurance. See infra notes 186-191 and accompany
ing text for a discussion of the uncompensated care pool in Massachusetts.
127. See Leonard, supra note 5, at A22 (citing Census Bureau data to calculate
three year averages of uninsured rates). Recently, Massachusetts has brought its unin
sured population below 10%. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
128. See Jill A. Marsteller et aI., Variations in the Uninsured: State and County
Level Analyses 2 (June 11, 1998), available at www.urban.org/heaIth/variatfulI.pdf.
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violate a state's equal protection guarantee? To answer this ques
tion, a legal advocate must overcome at least the following two hur
dles. First, whether a state's health care financing system
"interferes" with or "denies" a resident's constitutionally protected
interest, assuming one can identify a protected interest in the state
constitution such as an interest in normal opportunity range; and
second, whether the courts must review this interference under a
heightened level of review or merely a deferential one.
1.

Indirect State Action

A strategy for overcoming the first hurdle is to argue that a
state law can indirectly "interfere" with a citizen's constitutionally
protected interest by unequally distributing a resource necessary for
exercising that interest. In other words, a state can deny equal pro
tection indirectly by not acting neutrally-by acting in a manner
that prevents some people from exercising their constitutionally
protected interest, even if the state had no obligation to provide the
underlying benefit in the first place. 129 Applying this argument to
the subject at hand, it can be asserted that the state's health care
financing laws unequally distribute access to health care, which is
necessary to exercise one's interest in his normal opportunity range
(assuming the state's constitution protects that interest).130 Even if
a state has no affirmative constitutional duty to provide health care,
a state may unconstitutionally interfere with a citizen's opportunity
interest if the state's financial assistance protects some citizens' op
portunities but not others'.
In certain contexts the United States Supreme Court has rec
129. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (holding
that although the state has no obligation to provide medical care, once it does, it may
not restrict it by imposing unconstitutional residency requirement); Harper v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that if state chooses its legislature
with elections, it cannot deny participation by charging poll tax); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that if a state provides for appellate process, it must provide
indigents with free trial transcripts); Women's Health Ctf. of W. Va. v. Panepinto, 446
S.E.2d 658, 667 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that when the state government provides medi
cal care for the poor, "it has an obligation to do so in a neutral manner so as not to
infringe on the constitutional rights of our citizens"); see also, Symposium, Is There a
Constitutional Right to Vote and Be Represented?: The Case of the District of Columbia,
48 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 615 (1999) (interpreting Griffin and Harper as articulating the
principle that "the government may not provide benefits to people on a basis that dis
criminates against the poor - even if the government had no obligation to provide the
underlying benefit in the first place").
130. Below, I argue that the Massachusetts Constitution protects this interest in
fair equality of opportunity; however, one would have to do this analysis on a state-by
state basis.
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ognized that even if a state has no obligation to provide a benefit to
its citizens, once it does, it must do so in a constitutionally permissi
ble manner. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois,13l the Court held
that even though Illinois had no constitutional obligation to provide
any appellate review of criminal convictions, once this system was
in place, the state was required to provide the poor with free trial
transcripts to make their appellate rights meaningful. 132
However, the United States Supreme Court, in a series of
abortion funding cases, was not persuaded that withholding Medi
caid funding for abortions "interfered" with a woman's fundamen
tal right of reproductive choice, even if the state had funded other
medical care.!33 For example, in Maher v. Roe,134 the Court noted
that the "Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay
the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or in
deed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. "135 However,
the Court also noted that "when a State decides to alleviate some of
the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner in
which it dispenses benefits IS subject to constitutional
limitations."136
In Maher, the Court found that the manner in which Connecti
cut dispensed medical benefits did not run afoul of the Constitu
tion. It found that the Equal Protection Clause does not require a
state, which chooses to participate in the Medicaid program, to fund
medical services incident to non-therapeutic abortions for indigent
woman even if it funds services incident to childbirth. 137 The Court
reached this result by reasoning that poverty is not a suspect class,
and the restriction does not impinge upon the woman's fundamental
right of reproductive choice.138
Likewise, in Harris v. McRae,139 the Court upheld federal reg
ulations restricting Medicaid abortion funding because the Court
131. 351 u.s. 12 (1956).
132. Id. at 19.
133. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (finding that the state had no positive duty to protect citizens from private be
havior). For an overview and critical commentary on the Supreme Court's adherence
to the notion of a negative conception of the Constitution, see Susan Bandes, The Nega
tive Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
134. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
135. Id. at 469.
136. Id. at 469-70.
137. Id. at 470.
138. See id. at 470-74 (finding "the Connecticut regulation places no obstacles ...
in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion").
139. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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found that the regulations did not place any obstacle in a woman's
path.1 40 In fact, the Harris Court found that the restrictions placed
on an indigent woman were not even the product of government
action, but of private action, namely, the woman's indigence.1 41
However, some state courts, including Massachusetts, have
gone beyond the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of what
constitutes government "interference" of constitutionally protected
interests. These courts have held that similar abortion funding re
strictions do interfere with, or place obstacles in front of, a woman's
fundamental right of reproductive choice.1 42 For example, the Su
preme Court of West Virginia, interpreting its own constitution as
providing enhanced guarantees over the federal constitution, held
that "when state government seeks to act 'for the common benefit,
protection and security of the people' in providing medical care for
the poor, it has an obligation to do so in a neutral manner so as not
to infringe upon the constitutional rights of our citizens."143 Given
the reality of being poor, the court found that the denial of funding
for medically necessary abortions affects the health and safety of
140. Id. at 316-18.
141. Id. at 316.
142. See Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 781 (Cal.
1981) (having enacted a general program for providing medical services to the poor, the
state statute that withholds benefits from otherwise qualified people solely because they
seek to exercise their constitutional right to reproductive choice is "plainly unconstitu
tional" under the state constitution); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1986) (finding that regulations under the Connecticut's Medicaid Program restrict
ing funding of abortion violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution);
Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387,398,402 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing the
Supreme Court's "negative constitutional principle" underlying Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), but going beyond its application in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
and finding that the state's choice not' to fund abortions is "achiev[ing] with carrots
what [it] is forbidden to achieve with sticks" and is, therefore, unconstitutional pursuant
to the state's equal protection guarantees); Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17,
19 (Minn. 1995) (interpreting the Minnesota Constitution to afford broader protection
than the federal Constitution, and finding that the state statute funding childbirth-re
lated services but forbidding funding for therapeutic abortions violates a woman's fun
damental right of privacy); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (N.J. 1982)
(finding that the state statute prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions except to save
the life of the mother violates the equal protection guarantee under state constitution);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Res., 663 P.2d 1247, 1261 (Or. App.
1983) (holding that the state's prohibition on funding medically necessary abortions is
invalid under Oregon Constitution Privileges and Immunity Clause); Women's Health
Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (W.Va. 1993) (finding abortion
restriction under the Medicaid program violates state's duty to provide medical care for
the poor in a neutral manner so as not to infringe upon the constitutional rights of
citizens).
143. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d at 667 (emphasis added).
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indigent women.14 4
The question, the court noted, becomes whether this "impinge
ment on safety" resulting from the state statute "rises to the level of
impermissible state action."145 The court held that it did, because
the state's "equal protection clause" serves the goal of "fundamen
tal fairness."146 Specifically, the state constitution "imposes an 'ob
ligation upon state government ... to preserve its neutrality when it
provides a vehicle' for the exercise of constitutional rights. "147
"Given [the state's] enhanced constitutional protections," the court
concluded that "the provisions of [the challenged statute] constitute
undue government interference with the exercise of the federally
protected right to terminate a pregnancy."148 Therefore, because
the state undertook to fund medical care for the poor, and because
the funding was not neutral, the state violated its constitution's
equal protection guarantee.149
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also held that its state's
Medicaid statute restricting funding for non-ther.apeutic abortions
"violates the right of pregnant women to equal·protection of the
law."150 Recognizing that "[n]either poverty nor pregnancy gives
rise to membership in a suspect class," and that there is no funda
mental right to funding for an abortion, the court reasoned that the
equal protection violation occurred because the state funding "dis
criminates between those [women] for whom medical care is neces
sary for childbirth and those for whom an abortion is medically
necessary. . .. By granting funds when life is at risk, but withhold
ing them when health is endangered,"151 the court observed that
"the statute denies equal protection to those women entitled to nec
essary medical services under Medicaid."152 Therefore, the court
concluded, the statute "impinges upon the fundamental right of a
woman to control her body and destiny ... [because] the State ad
mittedly seeks to influence the decision between abortion and
childbirth."153
Thus, some states have provided more protection for a wo
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

/d. at 665.
Id.
See id. at 666.
Id. (citing United Mine Workers v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 354 (1983».
/d. at 667.
See id.
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 927-28 (N.J. 1982).
/d. at 934.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

356

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:327

man's right to reproductive choice by expanding the manner in
which the government can "interfere" with protected constitutional
interests. The state courts agree with the Supreme Court that there
is a fundamental right to privacy, which includes reproductive
choice. They also agree that there is no fundamental right to re
sources that one might need to exercise that right. Moreover, they
agree that when a government undertakes to provide the resources,
it must do so in a constitutionally permissible manner.
However, some states part company with the Supreme Court
over whether unequally distributing the resources necessary to ex
ercise a protected interest actually "interferes" with that interest.
Unlike the Supreme Court, which requires the government action
to "directly interfere" with, or "place obstacles" in the path of, the
interest, some state courts only require that the government action
"indirectly interfere" with that interest.1 54 In other words, some
state courts have found that laws unequally distributing resources
necessary for exercising a protected interest constitute state action
even though they "indirectly interfere" with that interest.
This expanded approach of government "interference" is what
the legal advocate can argue to state courts when applying a state's
equal protection guarantee to challenge its health care finance laws.
If a state constitution protects an interest in normal opportunity
range, and a state has undertaken to provide access to health care
services, then financing laws that unequally distribute this access
will "indirectly interfere" with that interest.
2.

Judicial Review

In attempting to argue that by providing unequal assistance in
obtaining health care a state violates its equal protection guaran
tees, a legal advocate must overcome a second hurdle-the level of
judicial review. The legal advocate must persuade a state court that
it should use a heightened standard of review or scrutiny and that
the financing laws at issue fail this review. In other words, he must
convince the state court to go beyond the rigid federal levels of re
view-strict scrutiny or rational basis-and use some degree of
mid-level review, given the importance of health care and its role in
protecting opportunity.
A number of states, which have gone beyond the Supreme
154. See, e.g., Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 401 (1982) (noting
that "it is unimportant whether the burden imposed [by the law] is direct or indirect"),
discussed infra in Part IV.C.
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Court in expanding equal protection guarantees in other contexts,
have adopted their own methods of judicial review to analyze equal
protection claims.155 Importantly, these methods do not fit squarely
within the rational basis or strict scrutiny regime. One study esti
mates that of those states which provide more expansive equal pro
tection guarantees, twelve have developed their own, more flexible,
methods of judicial review.1 56 For example, some states apply a bal
ancing test whereby the court "place[s] a greater or lesser burden
on the state to justify a classification depending on the importance
of the individual right involved."157 In some cases, these balancing
tests allow a court to analyze interests that are less than fundamen
tal.1 58 Other states apply an intermediate scrutiny test. Under this
test, classifications must bear "a reasonable and substantial rela
tionship to the object sought to be accomplished by the legisla
tion."159 Still others use "heightened rational basis" scrutiny.160
What is important to note about these various methods is the
155. See Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 257-58, nn.72-76.
156. Id. at 257.
157. Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair Servo V. Alaska Dep't of Transp. & Pub.
Facilities, 754 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Alaska 1988) (citations omitted); see also DuPree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (balancing students' right to
receive education against the government's financing plan); Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973) (finding education not to be a fundamental right but analyz
ing equal protection challenges by weighing the detriment to children's education
against the justification for school financing); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 145 (Or.
1976) (adopting the New Jersey balancing approach in Robinson).
158. See DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 93; Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309,
1311,1314 (Mont. 1986) (holding that when an important interest such as welfare bene
fits is implicated, the classification must be reasonable and must outweigh the individual
interest in obtaining benefits to be constitutional), superseded by constitutional amend
ment as stated in Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 938 P.2d 658, 662 (Mont.
1997); David J. Shannon, Note, "No Pass, No Play": Equal Protection Analysis Under
the Federal and State Constitutions, 63 IND. L.J. 161, 174-75 (1987) (discussing Mon
tana's middle tier analysis in Bartmess V. Bd. of Trs., 726 P.2d 801 (Mont. 1986), for
interests that are less than fundamental).
159. Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 757 (Va. 1988) (citations
omitted); see also Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 733
(Idaho 1993) (determining "whether the legislation substantially furthers some specifi
cally identifiable legislative end"); Harman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (Neb. 1991)
(holding that, to be constitutional, a classification must bear a "reasonable and substan
tial relationship to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation") (citations
omitted); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (N.H. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that
the appropriate standard of review for classifications involving sufficiently important
rights is "whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair and sub
stantial relation to the object of the legislation").
160. See Johnson v. State Hearing Exam'rs Office, 838 P.2d 158, 164-66 (Wyo.
1992) (holding that state law provides greater protections against discrimination than
federal law, including a "heightened" rational basis scrutiny).
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flexibility they provide the legal advocate for going beyond the
rigid, analytic, two-tiered regime into which the Supreme Court has
boxed itself. Not only might a state court provide more heightened
review for an expanded number of classifications but also for an
expanded number of non-fundamental rights. The latter expansion
is particularly relevant for purposes of this Article because the Arti
cle has assumed that although the individual has no fundamental
state constitutional right to health care, a state court should never
theless treat the normal opportunity range interest under some type
of heightened review. The flexibility of state constitutional review
provides the necessary tools for dealing with this important but
non-fundamental interesV 61 Part IV·of this Article applies this le
gal framework to determine whether the Massachusetts health care
financing laws run afoul of Massachusetts equal protection
guarantees.
IV.

ApPLICATION: UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE PURSUANT
TO THE MASSACHUSETTS EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Although some commentators have criticized the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court for ignoring its own rich constitutional
history, and for frequently ruling in lockstep with the Constitu
tion,162 analysis of the SJC is still appropriate for two reasons. First,
there is sufficient evidence that the SJC does engage in independent
state constitutional adjudication that protects individual liberties
beyond the federal rninimum.1 63 Second, SJC decisions have influ
161. Importantly, for purposes here, the Massachusetts SJC has indicated a will
ingness to take a flexible approach to equal protection analysis. See infra note 248 and
accompanying text.
162. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REv. 761, 785-89, 793-94 (1992) (arguing that Massachusetts is an example of
a state that fails to use its constitutional history to provide a proper distinction between
federal and state constitutional analysis and more often than not takes a lockstep juris
prudential approach).
163. See Robert A. Marangola, High Court Study: Independent State Constitu
tional Adjudication in Massachusetts: 1988-1998, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1625, 1629, 1631-34
(1998) (noting that the SJC uses the primacy approach half the time, and uses a combi
nation of the supplemental and dual approach for the other half, but overall the SJC
utilizes the Massachusetts Constitution "to protect individual liberties beyond what the
Supreme Court has determined to be the minimum").
In particular, the SJC has on numerous occasions exercised its prerogative to inter
pret its constitution more broadly. See Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387,
400 (Mass. 1981) (discussing how the Massachusetts Constitution affords a greater de
gree of protection to woman's right to choose abortion than does the Federal Constitu
tion); Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1279, 1293 (Mass.
1980) (finding that the death penalty contravenes Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights
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enced other state high courts' decision making, which is important
for legal advocates outside Massachusetts. l64
Thus, Part IV uses the Massachusetts Equal Protection Clause
to challenge the constitutionality of its health care financing laws.
First, it briefly summarizes Massachusetts' public health insurance
programs, explains how they unequally distribute access to health
care, and identifies their impact on Massachusetts residents. Part
IV next argues for an interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitu
tion which would include a protected interest in fair equality of op
portunity, and hence one's normal opportunity range. After
demonstrating that the SJC has gone beyond the Supreme Court in
what it determines is state interference, and that the state's unequal
distribution of health care interferes with a resident's normal op
portunity range interest, Part IV defends the application of a
heightened standard of review and argues that the financing laws
fail this review.
A.

Massachusetts Health Insurance System

With the failure of the Clinton health insurance reform, Massa
chusetts, like many states, turned away from universal health insur
ance legislation in favor of an incremental approach. In 1996, the
legislature abandoned the 1988 Massachusetts Medical Security
Act,165 which called for universal coverage within eight years, and
even if permissible under the Federal Constitution); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 515-16 (Mass. 1979) (using peremptory challenges to eliminate black jurors
deprived defendants of their State constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury;
more strict than requirement of Federal Constitution); cf Dist. Attorney for Plymouth
Dist. v. N. Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 399 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J., dissenting)
(arguing that article 14 of the Declaration of Rights may provide protections beyond
those of the Federal Constitution in the area of unreasonable searches and seizures);
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 380 N.E.2d 669, 675 (Mass. 1978) (holding that the State Con
stitution may afford greater protections than Federal Constitution, but not in circum
stances of this case).
164. See David Blumberg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
on State High Court Decisionmaking 1982-1997: A Study in Horizontal Federalism, 61
ALB. L. REV. 1583 (1998). For example, although Massachusetts was not the first state
to hold that the state constitution required the provision of an "adequate education"
and that the state's system of school financing was unconstitutional, since McDuffy "ten
state high courts have cited [it] in opinions that decided the constitutionality of their
own state education funding system." Id. at 1606 n.137 (citing the ten cases). Moreo
ver, these states are spread throughout the country, including Alabama, Arizona, and
Florida. Id. at app. 1.
'
165. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118F, § 1 (West 1993) (repealed 1996) (noting
that "the access of residents of the commonwealth to basic health care services is a
natural, essential, and unalienable right"). Massachusetts also abandoned a "payor
play" statute, which required employers to provide their employees with health insur
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replaced it with expanded coverage for children and a pharmaceuti
cal benefit program for low income seniors.166 The following pro
vides an overview and a recent evaluation of Massachusetts' current
health care assistance programs.
Most Massachusetts non-elderly adult residents, almost 70% in
1998, have employer-based health insurance,167 For residents with
out employer-provided insurance, Massachusetts offers about sev
enty-five different health care programs. These programs primarily
benefit low-income uninsured and underinsured Massachusetts re
sidents, and range from comprehensive insurance programs such as
MassHealth, to local, targeted programs, such as the Family Plan
ning Program. 168
At the center of these programs is MassHealth, Massachusetts'
version of Medicaid, which offers comprehensive benefits to per
sons whose family income is below 200% of the federal poverty
leveL169 The remaining programs attempt to reach these individu
als who do not qualify for MassHealth, but who do not have access
to insurance by any other means. For example, if a child is not eligi
ble for MassHealth, he may be eligible for the Children's Medical
Security Plan,170 which provides limited primary care, and for the
Uncompensated Care Pool,171 which offsets payments for hospital
ance coverage or to contribute to a state fund for financing coverage, see MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 151A, § 14G(b) (1998) (amended 1996), in light of federal court decisions
putting its legality in doubt. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F.Supp. 695,709
(N.D. Cal. 1977), affd 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980) (invalidating Hawaii's Prepaid
Health Act under Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA».
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18 (1998) (originally enacted as An Act As
sisting in Making Health Care Available to Low Income Uninsured and Underinsured
Residents of the Commonwealth, Acts of 1997, ch. 47). More recently, the legislature
passed laws protecting patients' rights. See An Act Protecting the Health and Safety of
Massachusetts Consumers from Certain Managed Care Practices in the Insurance In
dustry, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6A, § 16D (Supp. 2000). See infra note 168 for a
description of these and other Massachusetts' programs.
167. MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH
CARE TRENDS: 1990-1999 25 (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter TRENDS] available at http://
www.state.ma.us/dhcfp/pages/pdfltrends.pdt; see also MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE
FIN.' & POLICY, HEALTH INSURANCE STATUS OF MASSACHUSETTS RESIDENTS 9 (Oct.
1998) (reporting 82% for 2000) [hereinafter HEALTH STATUS] available at http://
www.state.ma.us/dhcfp/pages/pdflhismI200.pdf.
168. See MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS (2000) (containing information on seventy-five health care
programs available to Massachusetts residents who are uninsured or underinsured)
[hereinafter ACCESS] available at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcfp (to order catalog).
169. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118E, §§ 9A, 9B (1998).
170. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 24G (1998).
171. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G § 18 (1998).
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care, if needed. Other gap-filling programs such as the Senior Phar
macy Assistance Program l72 help the elderly and disabled who are
not covered under MassHealth or who are underinsured. Below is
a brief description and evaluation of these four programs.173
MassHealth, formally known as Massachusetts' Medicaid pro
gram, offers "comprehensive health care coverage to more than
500,000 eligible Massachusetts residents, including low-income fam
ilies, children up to age eighteen, pregnant women, individuals with
disabilities, and individuals out of work for an extended period of
time."174 MassHealth has expanded eligibility to children and fami
lies to 200% of the federal poverty level and has carved out differ
ent programs for individuals not eligible for traditional
MassHealth. 175 Those eligible are typically enrolled in a managed
care plan and provided with a comprehensive set of benefits, in
cluding hospital and physician services, dental, optical, laboratory,
mental health services, and othersp6 The program is administered
by the Division of Medical Assistance. 177
The Children's Medical Security Plan is a health insurance pro
gram that provides only limited primary and preventive care for
children under nineteen .. A child under nineteen is eligible only if
he is not eligible for MassHealth and has no other source of insur
ance. 178 Children of families whose income is at or below 200% of
the federal poverty level participate for free. Families with incomes
between 201 % and 400% contribute $10.10 per child per month,
172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. U8E, § 16B (1998) (repealed as of Oct. 1, 2001).
173. I have chosen these four programs because the Division of Health Care Fi
nance and Policy has specifically evaluated each. See infra note 174.
174. MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, AN EVALUATION OF HEALTH
CARE PROGRAMS FOR Low INCOME UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MASSACHU
SETTS RESIDENTS 4 (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter EVALUATION].
175. Id. MassHealth offers numerous benefit packages depending on income and
personal circumstances: MassHealth Standard (traditional Medicaid); MassHealth
CommonHealth (for disabled adults and children not eligible for MassHealth Stan
dard); MassHealth Family Assistance (for children who do not qualify for MassHealth
Standard or CommonHealth); MassHealth Family Assistance for Adults without Chil
dren (for adults working for small employers who cannot afford premiums);
MassHealth Prenatal (for pregnant women); MassHealth Basic (for individuals unem
ployed for a long period of time); MassHealth Buy-In (for selected individuals with
private insurance premiums); and MassHealth Limited (for emergency services). See
ACCESS, supra note 168, at 9-31.
176. See ACCESS, supra note 168, at 11.
177. !d. at 1.
178. MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, AN EVALUATION OF HEALTH
CARE PROGRAMS FOR Low INCOME UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MASSACHU
SETTS RESIDENTS, CHAPTER 1: THE CHILDREN'S MEDICAL SECURITY PLAN 2 (June
2000).
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but not more than $31.50 per month. Families with incomes over
400% of the federal poverty level contribute the full premium of
$52.50 per child per monthP9 Benefits include, in part, routine
well-baby check-ups, immunizations, doctor's office visits, limited
mental health visits, emergency care up to $1000, certain diagnostic
tests, up to $200 per year of durable medical equipment, up to $200
per year for prescription drugs, and primary and preventive dental
benefits.180 The Department of Public Health administers the pro
gram by contracting with a private entity, Unicare, to process claims
and to. provide customer service, premium collection, and utiliza
tion management. 181 As of March 2000, about 21,000 children were
enrolled in this program; children under twelve in families between
201-400% of federal poverty level constitute the majority of the
enrollment. 182
The Senior Pharmacy Assistance Program, administered by the
Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance, helps persons sixty
five and older who are not eligible for MassHealth and .have no
other health insurance that provides prescription drug coverage. 183
To be eligible, individuals must also be Massachusetts residents,
have lived in the state for the past six months, and have a gross
annual income below 150% of the federal poverty level.1 84 Eligible
participants receive a $750 benefit for prescription drugs, and must
make co-payments of $3 for generic drugs and $10 for brand name
drugs. As of February, 1998,20,000 seniors were enrolled, the ma
jority of which were white women with an average age of seventy
seven. 18S
Finally, Massachusetts has an uncompensated care pool
("pool"), administered by the Division of Health Care Finance and
Policy.1 86 The pool reimburses hospitals and community health
centers that provide free heath care services to Massachusetts re
sidents who are uninsured or underinsured. 187 To be eligible, a per
179.
,180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

183.

EVALUATION,

184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
See

187.

MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN.

at 3-5.

supra note

MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch.

174, at 25.

118G,

§

18 (1998).

&

POLICY, AN EVALUATION OF HEALTH

CARE PROGRAMS FOR Low INCOME UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MASSACHU
SETrS RESIDENTS, CHAPTER 3: THE UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL 14

[hereinafter

POOL]'

(Nov.

2000)
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son must be a Massachusetts resident and have no other source of
coverage for a medically necessary service.1 88 The pool acts as a
"payer of last resort," and all applicants, therefore, are first
screened for eligibility in other programs. 189 Once a patient ap
plies, he may be eligible for one of three types of free care: full free
care, for people with family income up to 200% of the federal pov
erty level; partial free care, for those with family income between
201-400% of the federal poverty level; and medical hardship assis
tance, for people of any income whose medical expenses exceeds
their ability to pay.190 The pool is funded by three sources: a hospi
tal assessment ($215 million), a surcharge on payers (HMOs and
insurers) ($100 million), and the state's general fund ($30
million).191
Although these programs are praiseworthy, they represent a
patchwork quilt that is incomplete, complicated to administer and
use, and ultimately unstable. In spite of these programs, surveys of
the health insurance status of Massachusetts residents show that
about 350,000 - 400,000 residents were uninsured in 2000. 192 More
over, a 1998 survey reported that another 300,000 were uninsured
for various times during the previous year.1 93 And of the insured,
25 - 30% reported being underinsured. 194 Those individuals most
likely to be uninsured were between ages nineteen and thirty-nine;
about 4.4 % of children up to the age of five did not have health
insurance and neither did 7.1 % of children six through eighteen.
Most uninsured adults, about 300,000, were employed. 195 Signifi
cantly, over 80% of the uninsured adults were willing to pay for low
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 14. For a thorough discussion of types of free care and eligibility
guidelines, see BETII LAFoRTUNE GIES, MASS. DIV. OF HEALTII CARE FIN. & POLICY,
THE FREE CARE APPLICATION: A GUIDE FOR ACUTE HOSPITALS AND COMMUNITY
HEALTII CENTERS (1999); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 114.6, § 10.00 (1999) (outlining crite
ria for determining eligibility for free care at acute care hospitals and freestanding com
munity health centers); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 114.6, § 11.00 (2000) (discussing the
administration of uncompensated care pool).
191. POOL, supra note 187, at 17.
192. See TRENDS, supra note 167, at 21 (indicating 6.5% of Massachusetts' non
elderly population uninsured); POOL, supra note 187, at 6 (reporting 5.9% or 364,622
uninsured).
193. HEALTH STATUS, supra note 167, at 1.
194. Id. at 2. Underinsured included individuals who reported problems acces
sing care due to lack of enough coverage or encountering financial barriers. Id.
195. ld. at 1. Sixty percent of uninsured residents were willing to pay up to $100
per month, and 35% up to $300 per month. Id. at 18.
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cost insurance, if available. 196
Due to this lack of affordable health insurance, many residents
either do not access care, delay the care, or receive the care in
emergencies only.197 The majority of adults who were uninsured
were aware of the programs available but were not eligible. 198 For
many who are eligible, complicated enrollment procedures and the
stigma associated with the programs are barriers to their use. 199
Moreover, even among those individuals who were insured, 30%
reported needing medical services not covered, or indicated that fi
nancial barriers prevented them from getting needed care,zoo
More importantly, the stability of the programs rests, in part,
on a robust economy.201 Given the strong relationship between
health insurance and employment, if the economy were to slow .
down or go into a recession, the number of uninsured would rise
quickly due to increased unemployment and employers cutting ben
efits. If the number of uninsured were to rise, that would put pres
sure on existing programs and require the state to choose between
cutting benefits or lowering eligibility.
Are the state's health care assistance programs constitutional
under the state's equal protection clause? In other words, do the
health care financing laws impermissibly interfere with a protected
constitutional interest? To answer this question, one must first ex
plore whether the Massachusetts Constitution contains a protected
interest in fair equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity
is understood here as an interest in having the state take positive
steps to produce fairness in the competition for jobs, careers, of
fices, and other social rewards, by providing background institu
tions that help level the "playing field" for these goals. 202 Universal
196. Id. at 2. Sixty percent of the working uninsured adults were offered insur
ance by their employer but could not afford it, or others (26%) were not currently
covered due to a waiting period. /d.
197. Id. at 18, 22,25 (noting that the uninsured were more likely to receive care in
emergency rooms than in office settings, reported lower inpatient care use, and were
twice as likely not to receive needed care). For a discussion of the consequences of
having no health insurance, see supra Part III.C.
198. HEALTH STATUS, supra note 167, at 30.
199. EVALUATION, supra note 174, at 33,40.
200. HEALTH STATUS, supra note 167, at 25.
201. Id. at 30 (noting that a contributing factor to the lower uninsured rates in
1998 was "a strong state economy").
202. See RAWLS, supra note 84, § 14, at 73 (stating that fair equality of opportu
nity requires more than making positions and offices in society open in the formal sense
of proscribing discrimination; it prescribes that all persons be given a "fair chance to
attain" social positions and offices formally open to all); see also DANIELS, supra note
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primary and secondary public education are examples of back
ground institutions necessary for guaranteeing fair equality of op
portunity, given their role in protecting one's normal opportunity
range. Likewise health care institutions, like hospitals and doctors,
also help guarantee fair equality of opportunity because inadequate
access to these institutions adversely impacts one's normal opportu
nity range.
Once it is determined that the state constitution protects fair
equality of opportunity, one must consider whether the financing
laws interfere with this interest in a manner that runs afoul of the
state's equal protection clause. And finally, one must determine
under what standard a court should review the interference of this
protected interest. Would it use a heightened or merely a rational
basis standard of review, and would the laws survive one or both
types of review?
These are the questions that the remaining sections of this Ar
ticle will consider. Part IV.B locates the constitutional interest of
fair equality of opportunity in the state constitution's equality pro
vision. It argues for an interpretation of the provision that goes
beyond an interest in proscribing discrimination; instead, it suggests
that the provision includes an interest in having access to essential
background institutions, like education or health care, which pro
tect a person's normal opportunity range. Finally, Part IV.C shows
how the financing laws indirectly interfere with this interest, why a
court should review this interference under a heightened standard,
and why' the laws would not survive this review. 203
B.

Protecting Opportunity Under Massachusetts Equal Protection
Clause

The equal protection language of the Massachusetts Constitu
tion is set out in Part I, Article 1, as amended in 1976 by Art. CVI.
Massachusetts' equal protection clause goes beyond the Fourteenth
Amendment because it specifies that "equality under the law shall
not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or na
tionalorigin."204 Like the Fourteenth Amendment, Massachusetts'
analysis of its equal protection clause includes two methods: analyz
82, at 39-42, 50 (noting that "the notion of fair equality of opportunity ... is focused on
producing fairness in the competition for jobs and careers").
203. See infra Part IV.C.
204. MASS. CONST. art. CVI. The Massachusetts Constitution was also amended
to prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons. See MASS. CONST. art. CXIV.
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ing whether the law discriminates against a suspect classification, or
whether the law denies a fundamental right to some individuals but
not to others.205 Under both methods, Massachusetts has expanded
its equal protection analysis beyond the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, it held that gender is a suspect classification deserving of strict
scrutiny review. 206 Second, Massachusetts has indicated a willing
ness to go beyond the two-tiered fundamental/non-fundamental
rights doctrine and apply a balancing approach when interests af
fected are very important. 207
The approach here would require the SJC to consider whether
meeting health care needs is important enough to require equal ac
cess to affordable health insurance. In other words, instead of ask
ing whether health care is a fundamental right, this section asks
whether health care, like education, is an important constitutional
interest. This section locates that interest in the meaning of equal
ity itself and argues that a court could interpret the Massachusetts
Constitution equality language as going beyond protecting formal
(or negative) equality opportunity, which forbids discrimination
based on suspect classifications. Instead, a court could interpret it
as protecting fair equality of opportunity, which prescribes taking
affirmative steps to guarantee background institutions that help citi
zens compete for jobs and careers open to all. Since having no
health insurance undermines fair equality of opportunity by shrink
ing one's normai opportunity range, having access to health insur
ance becomes an important state constitutional interest.
To begin the analysis, one must first establish a method of con
stitutional interpretation. In McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Of
fice of Education,208 the SJC set out its method of constitutional
205. See Murphy v. Dep't of Corr., 711 N.E.2d 149, 152 n.3 (Mass. 1999) (noting
that the standard of review for equal protection is identical for federal and state consti
tutions). But see infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text for an argument for a flexi
ble approach to judicial review.
206. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977) (raising the scru
tiny applied to sex discrimination to a level "at least as strict as the scrutiny required by
the Fourteenth Amendment for racial classifications").
207. See Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 N.E.2d 688, 689 n.4 (Mass. 1978)
(describing strict scrutiny and rational basis tests as "shorthand for referring to the op
posite ends of a continuum of constitutional vulnerability determined at every point by
the competing values involved"); see also Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Ath
letic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284,291 n.28 (Mass. 1979) (citing Marcoux). But see English v.
N. Eng. Medical Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Mass. 1989) (explaining its constitu
tional "continuum" in a way that seemed to minimize any difference between its analy
sis and the federal analysis).
208. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
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interpretation. There it decided the question of whether the state's
education clause required the legislature to provide adequate edu
cation for all residents. When interpreting the state constitution,
the court held, one must look to (1) the language and structure of
the provision so that it is construed "to achieve its dominating pur
pose,"209 and (2) "the conditions under which [the provision] and
its several parts were framed, the ends which it was designed to
accomplish, the benefits it was expected to confer, and the evils it
was hoped to remedy."210
1.

Language and Structure of the Equal Protection Clause

The Massachusetts equal protection clause reads, in relevant
part, that "all men are born free and equal." This language was
amended in 1976 to say "all people are born free and equal."211
The amended article goes on to say that "equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or
national origin."212 What is of interest here is the meaning of the
word "equal" in the phrase "free and equaL"· Does it mean merely
identical treatment under the law, i.e., the law shall not discriminate
based on these enumerated classifications? Or, did "equal" origi
nally mean something more?
An historical study of the Massachusetts Constitution discov
ered that a Lockean social compact theory formed the basis for its
justification, influencing its language and effect. 213 "The people of
Massachusetts," explains Robert Peters, "shared with Locke this
view [that] ... the state of nature was a state of freedom and a state
of equality."214 Locke's concept of natural freedom was under
stood as "a power,"215 or as a positive concept of liberty, meaning
freedom of self-determination. "This positive concept of liberty as
a power of self-direction," explains Peters, "was commonly ac
cepted in Massachusetts during the Revolution."216
209.
210.

Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).

211.

MASS. CONST. art. CVI.

212.

Id.
See RONALD M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780:

213.
A SOCIAL COMPACT 65-114 (1978). For a discussion of Locke's influence on the federal
constitution, see James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 205-13
(1990).
214. PETERS, supra note 213, at 70.
215. Id. at 71.

216.

[d.
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This view of natural liberty "as a power of self-determination
had as its direct corollary the concept of natural equality, which was
defined as an equality of liberty."217 This equality of liberty was "in
essence, political equality of the most basic sort": that no person
had political dominion over any other as a matter of birth right. 2i8
Importantly, Peters points out, the meaning of equality in this social
compact theory had two facets: on the one hand there was equality
of participation, i.e., equality of consent; and on the other, there
was equality before the law. 2i9 Thus, "equality" meant more than
having the state's laws apply identically to its residents; it also
meant each resident must be given an equal chance at participating
in government. 220
2.

Conditions Under Which the Clause Was Framed

Examining the meaning of "equality" thus supports the conclu
sion that the Massachusetts Constitution intends to protect re
sidents not only from an unequal application of the laws, but also
from unequal participation in making them. This conclusion could
be read narrowly to support the right to vote or the right to more
effective representation in government. It could also be read
broadly to support a government obligation to guarantee important
background conditions that help secure meaningful participation in
the Commonwealth generally. It should be read broadly for the
following reasons.
The importance of political equality in both theory and prac
tice was well understood in Massachusetts in 1780. The theoretical
importance of political equality finds expression in the constitu
tion's preamble, which states:
The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of indi
viduals: it is a social compact, by which ... all shall be governed
by certain laws for the common good. It is the duty of the peo
ple, therefore, in framing a constitution of government, to pro
vide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an
impartial interpretation, and a faithful execution of them; that
every man may, at all times, find his security in them. 22i
217. /d. at 72 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 73.
219. [d. at 190.
220. This is the meaning often referred to as "popular sovereignty." See
supra note 213, at 2; see also Gardner, supra note 213, at 200.
221. MASS. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).

PETERS,
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The preamble expresses a Lockean social contract where individu
als consent to government primarily for security, and they find this
security in the government's duties not only to apply and execute
the laws impartially, but also to guarantee equitable participation in
their "mode of making. "222
The guarantee of participation in government is an expression
of the broader concept of the right to self-determination. This is
supported by observing that in the context of adopting the equality
language in Part I, Article I, the delegates also adopted Part II,
Chapter 5, section 2-the education clause. The importance of in
cluding an education clause signifies an understanding that the gov
ernment plays a role in equalizing background conditions necessary
for fairness in the competition for social positions.
A central reason for including the education clause was its
strong relationship to equal political participation and the equal ex
ercise of one's rights and liberties generally. "Knowledge is among
the most essential foundations of liberty," wrote John Adams, the
principal architect of the Massachusetts Constitution and drafter of
the original education clause which was ratified verbatim. 223
"There is substantial evidence that John Adams believed that wide
spread public education was integral to the very existence of a re
publican government."224 Moreover, Adams wrote, "liberty cannot
be preserved without a general knowledge among the peo
ple,...[and for this reason] the preservation of the means of knowl
edge among the lowest ranks, is of more importance to the public
than all the property of all the rich men in the country."225 Others
also observed that without universal education "learning and virtue
will but rarely be found among the mass of the citizens, all offices of
course must fall into the hands of men of fortune, figure and educa
tion."226 The very possibility, in other words, for equal participa
tion in government, depended on the provision of adequate
education for all.
Beyond being a prerequisite for political participation, ade
quate access to educational institutions, as viewed by the framers,
222. Id.
223. PETERS, supra note 213, at 120.
224. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 535
(Mass. 1993).
225. Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 456-57 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
226. PETERS, supra note 213, at 119 (quoting the MASSACHUSETTS SPY, May 4,
1780).
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was a prerequisite for life's basic opportunities generally, i.e., for
self-determination. It was and is necessary for the enjoyment of the
other rights and liberties secured by the constitution. For example,
the education clause itself recognizes education's role as "being nec
essary for the preservation of [the people's] rights and liberties."227
And this is consistent with the preamble's claim that the central end
of government is not only to protect the body politic, but "to fur
nish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying in
safety and tranquility their natural rights, and the blessings of
life."228 Thus, the education clause is evidence that the framers of
the Massachusetts Constitution envisioned the goals of government
going beyond protection of its inhabitants merely in the sense of
preventing others from discriminating against them. Its goals also
included, in part, guaranteeing access to institutions, which are im
portant for enjoying the very rights the people consented to protect.
Given the inclusion of the education clause in the original con
stitution of 1780, then, the framers understood that equal applica
tion of the law was not enough to satisfy the meaning of being "free
and equal." The education clause suggests that the framers under
stood the need for a state to provide the resources to meet the edu
cational needs that are a prerequisite to satisfying fair equality of
opportunity. Thus, by utilizing the education clause to guarantee
adequate education for all children, the framers possibly recognized
that a difference exists between formal equality and fair equality of
opportunity.
Meeting educational needs was one very important means for
satisfying fair equality of opportunity in 1780. However, the extent
to which access to health care institutions affected one's basic op
portunities was probably not on the framers' minds, given the lim
ited role medicine had at that time. Today, however, access to
health care institutions arguably affects one's basic life opportuni
ties in the same way educational institutions did in 1780; thus, there
is no reason to believe that the moral logic of the equality provision
should not extend to health care institutions. If the Massachusetts
227. See MASS. CONST. Pt. II, ch. 5, § 2 ("Wisdom, and knowledge, ... diffused
generally among the body of the people being necessary for the preservation of their
rights and liberties ...") (emphasis added); cf JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 6 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press, 1952) (1690) ("Every
one ... ought ... to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not ... take away or impair
the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another. ") (emphasis added).
228. MASS. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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Constitution places a strong interest in education because of its role
in helping achieve fair equality of opportunity, then it presumably
places a similar interest in other institutions that also help achieve
fair equality of opportunity.
Nevertheless, to the extent that anything could have been done
to meet health care needs in the framing era, it was commonplace
for the government to play an active role in helping all residents.
For example, early in Massachusetts history the legislature took its
residents' health seriously. "Public responsibilityfor the prevention
of disease and the care of the ill was rooted most firmly in the New
England colonies and especially in the Massachusetts Bay Col
ony."229 Moreover, "[a]s far back as.1629, the General Court of
Massachusetts Bay Colony acted to protect the public health by
limiting the number of passengers on each ship carrying migrants to
the new colony."23o "By 1764," observed one· historian, "the city of
Boston was actively involved in providing free inoculations and fol
low-up care for the poor."231 And significantly, "[a]s the public
health historian John Blake has noted, Boston's regulation of small
pox inoculation implicitly expressed the principle that government
has a role to play in protecting the health of the public."232 There
fore, government did all it could to meet health care needs by help
ing all its residents.
In no way could the framers have understood the role that
health care institutions would eventually have in protecting fair
equality of opportunity. Nonetheless, since these institutions do
playa significant role in protecting one's normal opportunity range
similar to that of educational needs in the framing era, one can rea
sonably speculate that had access to heath. care been of primary
importance when the Massachusetts Constitution was formed, the
framers would have explicitly provided for it.
C.

Massachusetts Equal Protection Analysis of Health Care
Financing Law
Once it is clear that the Massachusetts Constitution protects

229. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the
Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 286 (1993).
230. Id. at 287 (citing Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seven
teenth Century, in PURITANISM IN SEVENTEENTH CENTIJRY MASSACHUSETTS 86 (David
Hall ed., 1968».
231. Id. at 289 (citing JOHN B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE ToWN OF BOSTON
1630-1822, 94, 116 (1959».
232. Id. at 290 (citing BLAKE, supra note 231, at 115).
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fair equality of opportunity, the inquiry becomes whether the
health care financing laws at issue "interfere" with this protected
interest. As noted above, Massachusetts, along with a number of
other states, has gone beyond the Federal Constitution when deter
mining whether a state law "interferes" with a state resident's con
stitutionally protected interests. 233 In Moe v. Secretary of
Administration and Finance,234 the Supreme Judicial Court held un
constitutional a state statute restricting Medicaid funding for any
non-life-threatening abortion. 235 In finding the statute unconstitu
tional, the SJC explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Harris v. McRae. 236 There, the Supreme Court upheld a substan
tially similar statute because it did not directly "interfere" with a
woman's right to reproductive freedom; the statute itself did not
place any obstacles in the woman's path, and the government was
under no obligation to remove obstacles not of its own creation. 237
In Moe, the SJC moved beyond the Supreme Court's adher
ence to the premise that a government can only burden a constitu
tional interest by "indirect" interference. 238 "[I]t is unimportant,"
the SJC stated, "whether the [state] burden is direct or indirect."239
What is important, the SJC found, is that the government act neu
trally, that is, with "genuine indifference," when it chooses to enter
constitutionally protected areas to establish a medical assistance
program and selectively limit its funding. 240 Noting that "[w]e are
not free to disregard the practical realities,"241 the court found that
the statute '''injected coercive financial incentives favoring child
birth into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to be free
from governmental intrusion. "'242
In essence, then, the court found that the state cannot indi
rectly interfere with constitutionally protected interests when it
chooses how to allocate public funds. The choice not to fund abor
tions has the practical effect of taking reproductive choice away
233. See supra note 142 and accompanying text for a discussion of state law
in terference.
234. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
235. Id. at 404.
236. Id. at 400; see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
237. See supra note 140 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harris.
238. 417 N.E.2d at 401.
239. Id. (citing Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence for this same
proposition).
240. Id. at 402.
241. Id. at 401 (discussing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972».
242. Id. (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting».

2002]

UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE

373

from women who rely on publicly funded health care, essentially
forcing them to choose childbirth. Thus, the plaintiff in Moe was
asserting a right to have abortion non-discriminatorily funded, since
unequal funding indirectly interfered with her constitutionally pro
tected reproductive rights. 243
Similarly, the state's choice to allocate funds so that only some
residents can obtain health insurance, and not all, indirectly inter
feres with a resident's constitutional interest in his normal opportu
nity range. The practical effect of selectively funding health
insurance for some and not others is to force some to choose not to
meet their health care needs, and likely forgo opportunities they
might otherwise have had. 244 It is this shrinking opportunity range
for health care needs that shows how the state indirectly interferes
with its residents' constitutional interest in fair equality of opportu
nity.245 In other words, a plaintiff challenging the laws in Massa
chusetts would assert a right to have his normal opportunity range
non-discrirninatorily funded, since unequal funding interferes with
his fair equality of opportunity interest.
If the health care financing laws at issue interfere with a resi
dent's constitutional interest in fair equality of opportunity, the
next question is whether this law can withstand judicial scrutiny or
review. As a preliminary matter, however, one must determine
what standard of review is appropriate where the interest is impor
tant but not fundamental. Under the federal two-tiered approach,
the Supreme Court would review the law under a rational basis
test.246 Under this approach, then, the state's financing laws would
be constitutional if they are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Unlike the federal approach, however, Massachusetts does not
appear to be locked into this rigid dichotomy; it has adopted a more
flexible stance with respect to judicial review of the constitutional
ity of its laws. For example, the SJC has conceived of the dichot
omy between rational basis and strict scrutiny review as
"[s]horthand for referring to the opposite ends of a continuum of
constitutional vulnerability determined at every point by the compet
243. See Jeffrey, supra note 32, at 329-30 (referring to this right as a "substantive
equal protection right").
244. See supra notes 100-117 and accompanying text for a discussion on the ef
fects of inadequate health insurance.
245. See supra at Part I1I.B for a discussion of equal access to health care.
246. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for an explanation of when the
Court will apply the rational basis test.
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ing values involved."247 In Moe, the court noted that "[w]e have at
times expressed ... [strict scrutiny] in similar language [as the Su
preme Court]," but "[a]t the same time, we have recognized to
some extent the limitations inherent in such a rigid formulation [of
judicial review]."248 The SJC has found that its cases exemplify "a
more flexible approach to the weighing of interests that must take
place."249 Therefore, instead of mechanically applying either a ra
tional basis or strict scrutiny test, the SJC has, in some cases, chosen
to balance the interests involved-the plaintiff's right versus the
state's interest in regulating the exercise of that right.2 50
Whether the SJC will apply this flexible balancing approach to
create a third, heightened lev.el of review is unclear. Its use of this
flexible approach suggests that the court is open to a weighing pro
cess not wedded to either rational basis or strict scrutiny review.
However, when asked on a couple of occasions to create a third
level of review the court has refused. For example, in Murphy v.
Department of Correction, the plaintiff, a prisoner, challenged a
state statute requiring him to submit a DNA sample for inclusion
into the state database. 251 He conceded that he had no fundamen
tal privacy interest given his prisoner status and asked the court to
247. Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 N.E.2d 688, 689 n.4 (Mass. 1978) (emphasis
added); see also Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284,
291 n.28 (Mass. 1979) (citing Marcoux for this proposition).
248. Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 403 (Mass. 1981) (noting that
its "recent cases in this area [of judicial review] exemplify a more flexible approach to
the weighing of interests that must take place"); see Planned Parenthood League v.
Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 104-06 (Mass. 1997) (engaging in same balancing of
interest approach used in Moe when finding unconstitutional a state statute requiring
pregnant minors to obtain parental consent before having an abortion); see also In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (Mass. 1980) (balancing an individual's strong interest in
bodily integrity against state's interests); Comm. of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456
58 (Mass. 1979) (balancing applicable state and individual interests to determine when
it is appropriate to enforce lower court's order compelling prisoner to undergo life sus
taining hemodialysis); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427-29 (Mass. 1977) (balancing applicable state and individual interests to
determine when guardian may refuse medical treatment for third person). But see Mur
phy v. Dep't of Corr., 711 N.E.2d 149, 152 n.3 (Mass. 1999) (noting that the standard of
review for equal protection claims is identical under state and federal constitutions);
Doe v. Superintendent of Schs., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1097 (Mass. 1995) (applying rational
basis test to non-fundamental interest and implying that only a two-tiered approach to
judicial r~view exists).
249. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 403.
250. See id. at 404 (explaining that state's interest in preserving life is to be bal
anced against the woman's interest in choosing a medically necessary abortion);
Planned Parenthood, 677 N.E.2d at 104 (explaining the balancing of interests
approach).
251. Murphy, 711 N.E.2d at 153 n.4.
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use its flexible approach and apply a third level of review in consid
ering whether the statute impermissibly interfered with his privacy
interests. 252 The court refused the request,' noting that the "flexible
approach" does not require a third level of review, and that the
intrusion into his privacy was minimal, "especially in light of the
lowered privacy expectation of convicted persons."253
The SJC also refused the request for a third level of review in
English v. New England Medical Center, Inc .. 254 There the plaintiff
challenged the state's charitable immunity statute, which limited re
covery in his malpractice claim, arguing that it infringed his right to
a jury trial guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution. 255 The
SJC held that the statute did not infringe on the plaintiff's right to a
jury trial.256 The court, while acknowledging its use of a flexible
balancing approach to determine the constitutionality of legislation,
declined plaintiff's invitation to adopt a third level of review in the
context of a non-fundamental interest in tort recovery.257
In both Murphy and English, however, the SJC merely de
clined the invitation to adopt a third level of review under the facts
of each case. 258 For example, in Murphy, the court found that the
interest involved-the privacy of a prisoner-to be of diminished
importance. 259 In contrast, access to affordable health insurance is
of tremendous importance in light of its role in protecting one's in
terest in fair equality of opportunity.260 The advocate, then, must
make the case for the heightened importance of the constitutional
interests of accessing health care.
Although the SJC has declined to use the flexible approach to
create ,a heightened standard of review, it has not abrogated or
overruled its position that rational review and strict scrutiny are op
posite ends of a continuum of constitutional analysis where compet
ing values determine the outcome. It has merely indicated that this
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 541 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. 1989).
255. Id. at 330-31.
256. Id. at 331.
257. Id. at 333 (rejecting request to create standard stricter than rational basis for
interest in tort recovery).
258. Murphy, 711 N.E.2d at 153 n.4; see also English, 541 N.E.2d at 333 (noting
that "our acceptance of that method of analysis does not require us to adopt a third
level of review").
259. Murphy, 711 N.E.2d at 153.
260. See supra Part III.e (discussing the importance of health care insurance in
helping to protect equality).
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language does not require adopting additional levels of review. The
possibility remains open that the right case might justify creating
such a standard. 261 .
If an advocate can convince the SJC to adopt a balancing of
interests approach in the context of an interest in access to health
insurance, then he must next convince the court that the financing
laws would fail under this review. Below, I apply the balancing of
interests approach and argue that the health care financing laws
would not withstand this type of review.
In applying an interest balancing test, one must weigh the
plaintiff's constitutional interest involved-protecting, maintaining,
or restoring one's normal opportunity range versus the state's inter
est in regulating its social programs. 262 The state has primarily a
financial interest in unequally distributing health care resources be
cause it has limited resources in which to help the uninsured. The
putative goal of its medical assistance laws is to help the uninsured
and underinsured, but the state "has a valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs and ... it may legitimately at
tempt to limit expenditures for public assistance programs."263 The
state will argue that its medical assistance programs are not univer
sal because it has made a legitimate choice to help as many people
as best it can, given the fact that it is not possible to provide health
insurance for every resident. 264 For example, the SJC has upheld,
under rational basis review, the constitutionality of a state statute
that deemed ineligible for financial and medical assistance persons
without children who the Department of Public Welfare deemed to
be employable. 265 Importantly, it made this determination "in light
261. Although the SJC has not abrogated its flexibility language of Moe, in some
cases it speaks as if it has. For example, in Murphy the court claimed that "the standard
of review for equal protection is identical under the State and Federal Constitutions."
Murphy, 711 N.E.2d at 152 n.3. But such a claim belies the court's analysis in other
cases. For example, in Planned Parenthood League v. Attorney General, the court reit·
erated its use of the balancing of interest approach of Moe when analyzing a statute that
impinged on a fundamental right, explicitly noting that it had rejected the federal strict
scrutiny formulation. See Planned Parenthood League v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d
101,103 (Mass. 1997) (reaffirming Moe and noting that "(wJe rejected the position that
the State can justify regulations imposing such a burden only by demonstrating that the
regulations serve a compelling State interest, preferring a more flexible, less mechanical
balancing of interests") (emphasis added).
262. See Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402-04 (Mass. 1981)
(explaining and applying the interest balancing approach).
263. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 333 N.E.2d 388, 398
(Mass. 1975).
264. Cf id. at 399.
265. /d.
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of the Commonwealth's asserted inability to provide assistance to
all those in financial need. "266
But the legitimacy of the state's interest in deciding how best to
use its limited resources is based on a false assumption, namely,
that its resources are insufficient to enact a universal insurance pro
gram that is more comprehensive, more efficient, and less expensive
than its current programs combined. In 1998, two studies found
that a single-payer system, rather than the present mUlti-payer sys
tem, could "achieve the goal of universal, comprehensive, health
care while reducing the total cost of health care in the Common
wealth."267 One study was performed by the Lewin Group, Inc. 268
and the other by the Boston University School of Public Health. 269
The studies compare the current mUlti-payer Massachusetts' pro
grams and their projected future costs with a single-payer program
modeled on the Canadian system. Under the single-payer system,
all residents would be covered under a single government-financed
insurance program where the benefits package would cover long
term care, preventive care, acute and chronic care, including mental
health, and it would have no out-of-pocket costs such as co-pay
ments and deductibles. 270 Hospitals would be placed on annual
budgets to control the growth of hospital costS.271 The Boston Uni
versity study found that savings would begin in the first year, while
the Levin Group study found that savings would begin in the
sixth. 272
266. Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, No. CA 957599, 1996 WL 1185109,
at *1 (Mass. Super. June 25, 1999) (denying equal protection challenge from administra
tive decision to deny certain root-canal treatments because plaintiff not eligible pursu
ant to applicable regulations, given "that the money available for all publicly assisted
health care is not unlimited").
267. MASSCARE, UNIVERSAL SINGLE PAYER HEALTH CARE: A FISCALLY RE
SPONSIBLE ApPROACH, at http://www.masscare.orglsummary.htm (emphasis added).
268. See LEWIN GROUP, INC., MASSACHUSETfS COMPARATIVE PROJECTED
HEALTH EXPENDITURE MODEL (1998), at http://www.masscare.org!lewin.pdf; see also,
LEWIN GROUP, INC., ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH
CARE MODELS FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND: THE SINGLE-PAYER AND MULTI
PAYER MODELS 4 (2000), at http://www.healthcareforall.comllewin.pdf (performing the
same comparative study for the state of Maryland, and finding that single payer would
cover all Marylanders and reduce total health spending by $345.8 million, or 1.7%).
269. SOLUTIONS FOR PROGRESS, INC., & THE ACCESS & AFFORDABILITY MONI
TORING PROJECT OF THE BOSTON UNrv. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, UNrvERSAL COMPRE
HENSIVE COVERAGE: MODELING THE COST OF HEALTH CARE REFORM IN
MASSACHUSETfS (1998) at http://www.masscare.org/solutions.pdf.
270. MASS CARE, supra note 267, at 1.
271. Id.
272. Id. Similar findings were determined for the United States health care sys
tem when the Congressional Budget Office conducted a similar study by comparing a
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Given these facts, a single-payer program actually promotes
the state's interest in acting fiscally responsible and doing the most
it can with its limited resources. 273 Given the realities associated
with unmet health care needs, and their impact on one's normal
opportunity range, the scales tip quickly toward the plaintiff's inter
est in his right to have his normal opportunity range non-discrimi
natorily funded.
CONCLUSION

State constitutions do not offer much help for health care ad
vocates in the form of explicit or even indirect provisions for ex
panding access to health care. However, since access to health care
institutions is vital for meeting health care needs, and failing to
meet health care needs adversely impacts one's normal opportunity
range, an advocate may have success exploring whether a state con
stitution protects fair equality of opportunity. If it does, one may
convince a court to include access to health care institutions as one
type of institution, like education, essential for guaranteeing fair
equality of opportunity. Since every state constitution has an edu
cational clause, this is good evidence that state constitutions may
protect an interest in fair equality of opportunity, since certain re
sources are a prerequisite for the rights and liberties that the partic
ular constitution secures.
This analysis requires an interpretation of the Massachusetts
Constitution that would include an interest in fair equality of op
portunity, which would in turn require protecting an individual's
normal opportunity range. Moreover, given its penchant to go be
yond the Federal Constitution in expanding individual rights, one
might convince the SJC to find that the state's health care financing
laws indirectly interfere with this constitutionally protected interest.
Since the state has chosen to undertake financing health care for
some, the state violates its equal protection guarantees because the
laws are not applied neutrally. Finally, the state has also gone be
yond the Federal Constitution in using a more flexible standard of
review. It is important, therefore, to convince the court to balance
the plaintiff's right to have his interest non-discriminatorily funded
single-payer plan with various mUlti-payer proposals in the context of the health care
reform debate of 1993. See CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES OF HEALTH CARE
PROPOSALS FROM THE 102ND CONGRESS (1993).
273. For an example of a single-payer program for Massachusetts, see MASS CAM
PAIGN FOR SINGLE PAYER HEALTH CARE, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE TRUST
BILL, at http://www.masscare.orglmasstrust.htm.
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against the state's interest in deciding how to use its limited budget
for providing medical assistance. The plaintiff's right would prevail
because the state's interest is vacuous in light of the evidence that
universal, comprehensive health insurance programs exist which are
more efficient and less expensive than existing challenged ones.

